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I. INTRODUCTION: MEET THE PARENTS
No man ever steps into the same river twice, for it is not the same river and he
is not the same man.1
After nearly a decade together, a loving couple with their lives in-
tertwined socially, emotionally, physically, and financially, decides to
have a baby.  When it is discovered that the mother-to-be (“Mother”) is
infertile, the couple avails itself of modern reproductive technology.2
A fertilized egg, comprising biological material from one parent and
from an anonymous donor, is implanted into Mother.  Nine months
later, a beautiful baby girl is born, and the parents proudly announce
her birth.
Two and one-half years later, the parents separate.  A divorce is
not necessary to disentangle the family, as the couple’s twelve-year
relationship had never been memorialized by marriage.3  Following
the separation, each parent continues as parent to their daughter
whose surname since birth is the hyphenated last names of her two
parents.  Each parent shoulders one-half of the child’s expenses.  The
child resides primarily with Mother but spends roughly equal time
with each parent.4  Though they have ceased to live as a single-family
1. Heraclitus was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher who lived in ancient Ephesus
near Kusadasi, Turkey.  His philosophy embraced change. See Daniel W. Gra-
ham, Heraclitus, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/Heraclitus/.
2. Also called Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), ART includes all fertility
treatments in which both eggs and sperm are manipulated. Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology, THE FERTILITY INSTITUTES (July 27, 2013), http://www.fertility-
docs.com/art.phtml.
3. The couple could be labeled as “domestic partners.” See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 6.01 (ALI 2002) (“Domestic partners are two persons of
the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period
of time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple . . . .”); see also
infra notes 32 & 50.  A state’s conferring (or not) a legal title on the relationship
of the two parents is of independent legal significance and should not be determi-
native of parentage. See infra notes 32 & 50.
4. The hypothesized parenting schedule is consensual and nonjudicial.  It is, never-
theless, consistent with the national trend toward equal parenting time with
each parent. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(a) (West 2013).  The following
language was added to the child custody statute effective July 1, 2012: “In taking
into account the child’s best interest, the court shall order a custody arrangement
that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life
of the child . . . .” Id.  See also FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c) (2013), which highlights
the importance of a minor child’s “frequent and continuing contact with both par-
ents.”  Other states have statutes that maximize parenting time with each par-
ent. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.070 (2013); D.C. CODE § 16-914 (2013); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(a) (2013); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153-131(b) (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15. § 650 (2013);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41 (West 2013).
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unit, undoubtedly from the child’s perspective,5 she has two loving
parents.
When the parents’ cooperation turned into animus, Mother relo-
cated with the child to Australia.  Devastated, the abandoned parent
sought to gain shared custody of the child.  However, the trial judge
presiding over the case only acknowledged Mother as a parent and
summarily rejected the case.6  Under the applicable state law,7 the
child had only one parent.  How could it be that a biological progenitor
who had intended, anticipated, planned for, loved, raised, and finan-
cially supported a child could possess no rights as parent8 to that
child?
The answer turns on the fact that the other parent in this hypo-
thetical was not the father, but rather another mother who, in spite of
her genetic link to her daughter, was found to possess no familial rela-
tionship to her child under the relevant state law.9  With the use of
ART,10 the number of participants in the procreative process has in-
creased from the biologically required minimum of two to as many as
5. In Part III of this Article, I formulate an understanding of parentage that begins
with the child and looks up a generation to the parent rather than starting with
the purported parent and looking down.  Even the nomenclature “parentage”
reveals an unstated and misguided premise that the parent–child relationship is
evaluated from the top down.  Other areas of family law have incorporated the
child’s perspective. See William V. Fabricius & Jeff A. Hall, Young Adults’ Per-
spectives on Divorce: Living Arrangements, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV.
446 (2000); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.621 (2013) (requiring a court to consider,
among other things, the child’s preference when determining where to perma-
nently place him or her); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(a)(7)(A) (West 2013) (re-
quiring a court to consider the reasonable preference of a child who is at least
twelve years old as a factor in deciding custody); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-
108(c)(9)(A) (West 2013) (requiring a court to consider the reasonable preference
of a child who is at least twelve years old as a factor when a parent is relocating
and seeking to take the child with them).
6. The introductory hypothetical is based upon T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278
(Fla. 2013).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (2013); see infra text accompanying note 32.
8. Parent is defined as the lawful father or mother of someone. BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1222 (9th ed. 2009).  The etymology of parent is the present participle of
the Latin parere meaning “bring forth.” See OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://oxforddic-
tionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/parent (last visited July 28, 2013).
9. An egg was extracted from T.M.H., fertilized with sperm from an anonymous do-
nor and implanted into D.M.T., who carried the baby to term and gave birth.
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 788.  The child, thus, had one genetic father, who was not a
legal parent as the sperm was supplied through anonymous donation, and two
biological mothers, one genetically related to the child through the egg and the
other biologically related through gestation. Id. at 789.  Applying FLA. STAT.
§ 742.14 (2011) (which declares that an egg donor relinquishes all maternal
rights to the resulting child), the trial court awarded maternal rights to the birth
mother to the exclusion of the woman who provided the egg. Id. at 790–91.
10. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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six11 or even eight.12  The law must adjust to these possibilities.
While there may be additional nonbiological claimants to parentage,13
this Article sets forth the conceptual starting point that frames the
legal definition of parentage, namely, that the law must recognize as
parent any individual (regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or
marital status) who is biologically related to a child.14
II. WHY OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PARENTAGE IS
SO MUDDLED
Historically, questions surrounding the parentage of a child were
limited in scope to the identity15 of the biological father for support or
inheritance purposes.16  With time, additional parentage issues
presented themselves, specifically, the replacement of a biological par-
11. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1758 (1993) (notes the existence of two
genetic parents, two social parents, and a gestational mother and introduces the
concept of a gestational father).
12. John C. Sheldon, Test Tube Babies Meet Stone Age Statutes, 27 ME. BAR J. 140,
140 (2012) (discussing a case of first impression for the state of Maine regarding
the parentage of ART children and noting that eight different individuals may
qualify as parent).
13. Nonbiological claimants to parenthood would include (i) adoptive parents (whose
claims are statutorily substituted for the biological parents’ claim) (ii) intentional
parents (whose claims are contractually created being dependent upon the secur-
ing of a release of the biological parents’ claims via true donation of genetic mate-
rial and/or valid surrogacy contracts) and (iii) de facto (also called functional or
psychological) parents presenting the hardest cases (whose claims to parentage
are judicially created and may be duplicative of the biological parents’ claims).
See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
14. This Article is intentionally limited to addressing the parentage of those biologi-
cally related to the child by genetics or gestation.  The claims to parentage by
individuals who are not biologically related have been addressed by other schol-
ars. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Rede-
fining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990) [hereinafter Polikoff, Two
Mothers] (advocating expansive interpretation of adoption statutes to permit sec-
ond-parent adoption by gay and lesbian couples). See also Nancy D. Polikoff, A
Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children
of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201 (2009)
[hereinafter Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt] (advocating statutory
changes that would eliminate the need for a nonbiological lesbian mother to
adopt her own child).
15. See UNIF. ILLEGITIMACY ACT (withdrawn 1960) (the earliest (and largely unsuc-
cessful as evidenced by the fact it was later withdrawn by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) codification of uniform laws on
parentage addressed illegitimacy); UNIF. ACT ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PA-
TERNITY OF 1952 (withdrawn 1973); UNIF. PATERNITY ACT OF 1960 (withdrawn
1973).
16. Historically, all issues of “parentage” in the biological sense were synonymous
with “paternity.”  Sheldon, supra note 12, at 141.
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ent through adoption or the use of surrogacy arrangements17 to award
parentage contractually to infertile heterosexual couples.18  Conse-
quently, until fairly recently, the totality of parentage questions could
be resolved by reference to a state’s paternity, adoption, or surrogacy
laws and judicial decisions.  If there were a question regarding the
identity of a child’s father, states provided several alternative means
by which a man could establish parental rights in a child.19  Likewise,
in the surrogacy context, under both traditional20 and gestational21
surrogacy arrangements, the statutory and common law of the state
that governed a surrogacy contract determined who should be recog-
nized as the legal parents of the child.22  With respect to adoption,
17. Surrogacy can be viewed as a private, end-run around adoption.  Sheldon, supra
note 12, at 143.
18. “[A]ssisted reproduction technology was first recognized in the context of married
couples with fertility difficulties . . . .”  Ann M. Haralambie, HANDLING CHILD
CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 9:13 (2d ed. 2012).
19. See, e.g., In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. 2010) (discussing the various
ways in which paternity can be established under Tennessee law and noting that
ascertaining paternal status under Tennessee law is less straightforward than
ascertaining maternal status).
To be considered a child’s legal parent, a man (1) must be married to the
child’s biological mother at the child’s birth or the child must have been
born within three hundred days after the termination of the marriage or
the entry of a decree of separation, (2) must have attempted to marry the
child’s biological mother prior to the child’s birth in apparent compliance
with the law, even if the marriage is declared invalid, as long as the
child was born during the attempted marriage or within three hundred
days after the termination of the attempted marriage, (3) must have
been adjudicated to be the child’s legal father by a Tennessee court or
administrative body with subject matter jurisdiction or by a court or ad-
ministrative body of any other state, territory, or foreign country, (4)
must have signed an unrevoked and sworn acknowledgment of paternity
in accordance with applicable Tennessee law or pursuant to the law of
any other state, territory, or foreign country, or (5) must be the child’s
adoptive parent.
Id. at 598–99 (footnotes omitted). See also In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 723
(2005) (noting that the parentage statutes of Tennessee are limited to issues of
paternity and do not contemplate disputes over maternity, Chief Judge Drowota
writing for the majority stated, “The statutes also employ the term ‘mother’ in a
way that assumes we already know who the ‘mother’ is.”).
20. A surrogate mother under traditional surrogacy refers to “a woman who becomes
pregnant with an embryo that is the product of one of her own eggs.  She is genet-
ically related to the embryo.  She has agreed to bear the child on behalf of another
person, and not to claim parental rights to the child.”  Sheldon, supra note 12, at
141.
21. A gestational surrogate, also called a “gestational carrier” is “a woman who be-
comes pregnant with an embryo that is the product of another woman’s egg. . . .
Like a surrogate, she has agreed to bear the children on behalf of another person
and not to claim parental rights.”  Sheldon, supra note 12, at 141.
22. The treatment of surrogacy arrangements is far from settled in spite of being in
the legal spotlight for more than twenty-five years.  Some states prohibit surro-
gacy arrangements without differentiating between a traditional surrogate and a
gestational surrogate.  Other states regulate it by, for example, limiting surro-
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state law has detailed the process by which the rights of the biological
parents are terminated and parental rights are established in the
adoptive couple.23  Within each of these evolving24 bodies of law, how-
ever, the starting point of parentage is a biological connection to the
child.25
More recently, the parentage conversation has been extended to
children of same-sex couples.26  Generally, the legal discussion sur-
rounding the parentage of children of same-sex couples has focused on
establishing parentage using the laws of adoption.27  This focus is mis-
guided for children born “out of”28 a lesbian relationship.29  The adop-
tion process creates a relationship in one who is not a biological or
gacy to married couples. Compare Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)
(asserting a surrogate mother’s custody in contravention of the terms of the
(traditional) surrogacy contract she had signed), with In re Paternity of F.T.R.,
833 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 2013) (applying Wisconsin law to a traditional surrogacy
arrangement that was enforced against the surrogate mother). See generally
Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, by Other Means if Necessary: The
Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 799 (2012) (advocating national standards of uniform enforce-
ment and regulation of surrogacy contracts to rectify their disparate treatment
by states).
23. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.012–63.2325 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-101 (West
2013).
24. For a discussion of the evolution of the definition of fatherhood in the context of
welfare reform, see Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Re-
form, Child Support Enforcement and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 325, 326 (2005) (“For centuries the definition of fatherhood under American
law was simple: the mother’s husband.”). See also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn,
Marriage, Parentage and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 223 (2011) (stating
“[a]ll states continue to recognize at least a rebuttable presumption that a child
born within a marriage is the child of the husband . . . .”); cf. Murphy, supra, at
326 (noting that the “dramatic shift in family composition over the last several
decades in the United States has made the marital presumption increasingly in-
adequate as the sole definition of fatherhood under the law”).
25. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding that giving the bio-
logical mother but not the biological father a veto over adoption is an Equal Pro-
tection violation).
26. In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws intro-
duced the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”).  Nineteen states adopted the entirety
of the original incarnation of the UPA, and other states embraced portions of the
Act.  In 2000, the UPA was reworked, in part to be consistent with two other
uniform acts addressing issues of child custody and support, namely, the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) (1996) and the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) (1997).  Article seven of UIFSA,
entitled Determination of Parentage, states: Attempting to stay abreast of the
times, in 1988, the Conference also introduced the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception.  This act, however, was ineffective, enacted only by Virginia
and North Dakota before being superseded by the UPA in 2000.  The UPA was
further amended in 2002.  While the 2002 amendments to the UPA address chil-
dren of same-sex couples, further revisions are needed. See infra note 208.
27. Polikoff, Two Mothers, supra note 14.
28. See infra text accompanying note 132.
2014] THE BIRTH OF A PARENT: DEFINING PARENTAGE 805
birth parent.30  Not only does parentage based upon an adoption
model relegate same-gender parents to a conceptually secondary,
rather than primary, parental status,31 but all too often the adoption
statutes limit the right to adopt to “couples,” which brings both the
gender and the marital status of the adoptive parent into considera-
tion.32  Adoption laws are premised on the absence of or termination
of someone else’s parental status coupled with the demonstrative in-
tent to parent by the adoptive parent.33  Logically, adoption statutes
place both qualitative and quantitative limits on who may fill the pa-
rental vacancy through the right to adopt.34  Someone else’s pre-ex-
isting status as parent could constitute sufficient reason for denial of
parentage by adoption; an analysis of all parties with parental claims
29. In denying the adoption petition of a genetic mother whose lesbian partner had
given birth to a child conceived with ART using her partner’s egg, the lower court
stated that because the adoption laws create a parent–child relationship, adop-
tion by a genetic mother would be an “idle act.” In re Adoption Petition of C.C.,
No. A 19833, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Sept. 12, 1997), cited in Ryiah Lilith, The G.I.F.T.
of Two Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 207, 216
(2001).
30. See, e.g., Adoption, CAL. COURTS, www.courts.ca.gov/selfhelp-adoption.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2013, 4:17 PM).
31. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt, supra note 14.
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2013), which reads, “The donor of any egg, sperm,
or preembryo, other than the commissioning couple or a father who has executed
a preplanned adoption agreement under s. 63.212, shall relinquish all maternal
or paternal rights and obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting
children.”  A “ ‘commissioning couple’ means the intended mother and father of a
child who will be conceived by means of assisted reproductive technology using
the eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents.” FLA. STAT. § 742.13(2)
(2013).  This Article contends that gender and marital (or other relational) status
should be irrelevant in the determination of parentage.  More specifically, lack of
relational status should be irrelevant to the determination of parentage.  Pres-
ence of relational status may still be a factor supporting a presumption in favor of
parentage.  The relationship between marriage and the creation of family bene-
fits continues to evolve. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(partially repealing the Defense of Marriage Act by holding unconstitutional the
federal definitions of “marriage” as a legal union between a man and woman and
“spouse” as a person of the opposite sex who was a husband or wife).  However,
such changing legal landscape does not alter the analysis of parentage, as parent-
age does not depend upon the marriage of the parents or upon the parties’ func-
tioning as a family.
33. Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 163 (2002)
(“Adoption requires that one woman [a biological mother] give up a child so that
another woman [a nonbiological mother] can mother that same child.”).
34. Some courts have relaxed the literal reading of stepparent adoption statutes to
permit a second-parent adoption by the partner of the biological parent. See, e.g.,
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995); Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73
P.3d 554, 560 (Cal. 2003); In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004).
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is required.35  Acquisition or continuation of traditional parentage
based upon consanguinity,36 by contrast, requires neither satisfying a
qualitative standard37 nor referencing the parental rights of any other
person or persons.38  The determination is made as if in a vacuum
with the vertical relationship of child to biological parent as the only
consideration.39  The rights of one biological parent are contemporane-
ous with, equal to, and not mutually exclusive of the rights of another
biological parent.40
The questions of parentage posed by the introductory hypothetical
are more analogous to traditional questions of paternity based upon
establishing the biological connection to the child than they are to
questions of creating legal parentage in a genetic stranger by adop-
tion.41  Traditional thinking, namely, that a child can have only one
mother,42 has curtailed the logical extension of establishing paternity
35. Cahn, supra note 33, at 166–67 (examining the strong tie between birth mother
and child in the context of relinquishment of parental rights under “the lens of
relational feminism”).
36. Establishing the “blood relationship” would, in modern vernacular, be referred to
as DNA testing. Consanguinity, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/133242/consanguity (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).
37. The primary position of a biological parent is not dependent upon that individual
being the best parent.  Biological parents are shielded from the preliminary scru-
tiny of fitness, which occurs—statutorily—in the adoption context and—contrac-
tually—in the surrogacy context.
38. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (recognizing only
the genetic mother in a case involving a married couple who were the genetic
parents of the child and a gestational carrier who supported the genetic parents
legal status as parents and their desire to be listed as such on the child’s birth
certificate).  In finding for the genetic parents, the Belsito court framed the initial
inquiry for identifying parentage as, “Who are the genetic parents?” Id. at 766.
39. The importance of the biological connection of parentage is demonstrated in the
failure of the law to embrace the principle of a permanent contractual surrender
of parental rights that fall outside of the regulated areas of genetic donation,
adoption, and surrogacy contracts. See E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011) (holding that parental rights of biological father cannot
be terminated contractually).
40. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005).
41. Professor Melanie B. Jacobs has coined the term “paternity riddle” to identify the
complexity of determining legal fatherhood based upon the proper weighing of
the puzzle pieces of genetic connection, procreative intent, and function.  Melanie
B. Jacobs, Overcoming the Marital Presumption, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 289, 289 (2012)
[hereinafter Jacobs, Marital Presumption].  I suggest that the growing practice of
oocyte “donation” (also called ovum “sharing”) to a domestic partner has
presented a maternity riddle, as well. See infra text accompanying notes 107–15.
“Donation” is an inaccurate and misleading term for oocyte lending.
42. Some courts have shed this traditional thinking.  For a trilogy of cases in which
the California Supreme Court acknowledged the parentage of two mothers under
California’s version of the Uniform Parentage Act, see Elisa B. v. Superior Court,
117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); K.M., 117 P.3d 673; Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690
(Cal. 2005).
2014] THE BIRTH OF A PARENT: DEFINING PARENTAGE 807
by biology to the establishment of maternity by biology.43  As will be
addressed in Part II, maternity has been understood as a question of
fact, that fact being childbirth.44  Maternity is still a question of fact,
but the scientific facts have changed to permit two biologically related
females for one child.45  It has become prescriptive rather than de-
scriptive to limit the label of biological mother to either (i) the genetic
mother or (ii) the gestational mother.46  If a biological connection to
the baby is the starting point for legal parentage,47 the law must em-
brace the science supporting the biological connection of not only the
43. See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005) (Birch, J., dissenting).  In rejecting
the multifactor test used by the majority to award sole maternal rights to the
gestational mother based on intent and the referenced common law rule equating
maternity with childbirth, the dissent reasoned that genetics should be the deter-
minative factor. Id. at 735.  “[Genetics] is the test that our legislature has al-
ready ordained by providing that parentage may be established by either biology
or adoption.” Id.
44. Though there is little support for the proposition, it is said the common law dic-
tates that the birth mother is the legal mother of a child. In re C.K.G., 173
S.W.3d at 721 (citing Kermit Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive
Technologies and the Concept of Parenthood, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 97
(1998)); see also IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS 995
(5th ed. 2010) (“Until quite recently, the old saw was still largely true: maternity
is a question of fact, while paternity is a matter of opinion.  No more.”). But see
T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla. 2013) (stating “[w]e do not
believe that law review articles written by students and professors establish com-
mon law”).
45. See Lilith, supra note 29, at 208–11 (urging that legal recognition of both biologi-
cal mothers using the ARTs of gamete intrafallopian transfer and zygote infrafal-
lopian transfer is supported by the tests for parentage used by courts in
surrogacy disputes); Robert Martone, Scientists Discover Children’s Cells Living
in Mothers’ Brains, SCI. AM. (Dec. 4 2012), www.scientificamerican.com/arti-
cle.cfm?id=scientists-discover-childrens-cells-living-in-mothers-brain (providing
evidence of the biological connection between the birth mother and baby resulting
from gestation).  Microchimerism, “the persistent presence of a few genetically
distinct cells in an organism,” . . . “most commonly results from the exchange of
cells across the placenta during pregnancy, however there is also evidence that
cells may be transferred from mother to infant through nursing.” Id.; see also
Holly M. Dunsworth et al., Metabolic Hypothesis for Human Atriciality, 109
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15212 (2012) (claiming that research supports that a ges-
tational mother’s metabolism influences fetal size and length of gestation, two of
the many factors that make a person who she is).
46. Ruth Macklin, Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our Understanding of the
Family, THE HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1991, at 5–6; c.f. Lilith, supra
note 29, at 237.
47. See, e.g., Allison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that under
New York law, parentage is founded upon biology or adoption). But see Carvin v.
Britain, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (holding that a nonbiological, nonadoptive
woman could seek shared parentage with the biological parent based upon the
common law doctrine of de facto parentage).
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genetic mother but also the gestational mother.48  ART terminology,
which is deemed to waive the biological connection of parentage, must
be revised, as the suppliers of sperm and eggs may be intended par-
ents.49  In addition, parentage statutes that remain gender-specific,
with one individual identified as father and the other identified as
mother, simply do not contemplate or accommodate parentage by
same-sex couples.50  Consequently, the statutes of many states would
fail to acknowledge the parentage of both mothers in the introductory
hypothetical.  If the titles of parent are gender-limited, once the “posi-
tion” of mother is filled, the only parental vacancy is for a father.
This Article maintains that an intended parent with a genetic rela-
tionship to a child should be entitled to full legal parental rights and
obligations with respect to that child irrespective of the genetic par-
ent’s gender.  In order to achieve this equality, the law must replace
gender-specific biological routes to parentage with a gender-neutral
genesis of parentage.  The remainder of Part II will discuss two lead-
ing parentage cases (one from the state of California51 and the other
from the state of Florida52) in which a biological mother is seeking
recognition of her parental rights when such rights have been cut off
by her former partner who is the child’s gestational mother.53  Part III
of this Article will examine two flaws in current parentage statutes
that have fostered this inequality, namely, the false conflict between
the gestational and the genetic mother and, secondly, the unintended
outcome of gender-specific paternity statutes that provide men, but
48. Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: Heteronormativity,
Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 289 (2008).
49. See infra text accompanying note 112.
50. Since the repeal of illegitimacy statutes, parentage has not been derivative of
marriage; nevertheless, the gender-specificity of parentage statutes underscores
the traditional definition of marriage and, effectively, brings marital status back
into the parentage question.  Parentage and marriage must be decoupled in both
directions—marriage is neither a requirement for nor a benefit of parentage. See
Brief of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition at 17, Hollings-
worth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.12-144), 2012 WL 3864338, at *17
(“Parental rights are an important aspect of traditional marriage, but it does not
follow that marriage rights go wherever parental rights lead.”); see also L.F. v.
Breit, 736 S.E. 2d 711 (Va. 2013) (upholding appellate court’s decision holding
that in enacting the assisted conception statute, “the General Assembly did not
intend to divest individuals of the ability to establish parentage solely due to
marital status, where, as here, the biological mother and sperm donor were
known to each other, lived together as a couple, [and] jointly assumed rights and
responsibilities.”).
51. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
52. T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla. 2013).
53. This Article focuses on the parentage rights of the biological mother(s).  Other
scholars have addressed the parentage rights of biological unwed fathers. See
Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr,
and Michael H. Revisited, 53 LOY. L. REV. 395 (2007).
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not women, with several means by which to establish parental rights.
Part IV suggests that, in light of the steady increase in the number of
nontraditional families and the claim to parentage by the adults in
these nontraditional relationships with respect to the children they
intended to and did raise as their own,54 current statutory schemes no
longer provide a reliable starting point for the determination of par-
entage.  This part will advocate a paradigm shift, namely, that both
statutes and courts return to the essence of the parent–child relation-
ship: genetics.  By using the genetic relationship as a foundation for
the passage of gender-neutral parentage statutes and by embracing
advances in ART which extend the biology of parenting to a third ges-
tational parent, biology (limited by the intent to parent) will be the
first cornerstone of legal parentage.55  Part IV will propose a parent-
age decision tree that incorporates both the intent to parent and the
biological bases for parentage without respect for the gender of the
parent.  Additionally, Part IV will demonstrate that gender-neutral
parentage statutes are consistent with other existing parentage con-
cepts and public-policy positions.56  Part V will discuss the measures
that private parties, state agencies, and courts should take to resolve
54. According to a Pew Research Center 2013 LGBT Survey, twenty-three percent of
LGBT men and forty-eight percent of LGBT women are parents.  Jocelyn Kiley,
It’s Fathers Day for Many American Men, Including 23% of Those Who Are LGBT,
PEW RES. CENTER (June 16, 2013), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank//2013/06/16/
its-fathers-day-for-many-american-men-including-23-of-those-who-are-lgbt/.
55. The law has progressed to embrace the important role in parenting played by
parents (both biological and otherwise) and nonparents alike.  The author does
not contend that a biological link to the child is a logically necessary condition for
parentage but rather that it must be a logically sufficient condition for parentage.
Nor does the author diminish the importance of so called de facto, functional,
psychological or intentional parentage but notes that courts are varied in their
willingness to assign “de facto” parental status on a relative. See Estrellita A. v.
Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Fam. Ct. 2013) (judicially estopping a biological
parent from arguing that her former registered domestic partner was not a de
facto parent). Compare Gill v. Bennett, 82 So. 3d 383 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (deny-
ing de facto parental status to grandmother), with Marie C. v. L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of
Children and Family Servs., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224 (Ct. App. 1997) (awarding de
facto status to grandmother).  While arguably important to confer parentage in
some cases, these doctrines are, however, conceptually secondary to biological
parentage.  The need for legislative reform in the foundational underpinning of
parentage is transparent where a paradigmatic parent (under both a genetic- and
an intent-based model) like the genetic mother of the introductory hypothetical is
neither recognized as a natural—meaning biological—parent nor allowed to gain
parentage status based upon her intentions and actions via widely accepted doc-
trines available to nonbiological would-be parents.
56. The principle of gender-neutrality in the law should be unobjectionable to those
on either side of the political spectrum.  However, gender-neutrality as applied,
for example, to a state’s definition of marriage, becomes a political hot potato.  By
limiting the determination of parentage to the (nonmarital and nonsexual) rela-
tionship between parent and child, gender-neutrality in the context of parentage
statutes should not be a politically divisive issue.
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parentage cases in a gender-neutral manner until state legislatures
enact explicit gender-neutral parentage statutes.
A. Assisted Reproductive Technology Changes the Facts
The state laws of paternity, adoption, and surrogacy were seem-
ingly sufficient to resolve almost all issues that arose in the determi-
nation of a child’s parentage as long as the courts were dealing with
single parentage or traditional family parentage.57  The adequacy of
these laws58 began to crumble, however, as the ever-evolving capabili-
ties of ART enabled nontraditional59 couples to conceive and give birth
to children.60
With the advances in ART, the quest for an all-inclusive legal defi-
nition of parentage has proliferated.61  All too often this quest be-
57. But see L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E. 2d 711, 716 (Va. 2013) (showing that the state
statutory scheme in Virginia proved insufficient to determine parentage of a bio-
logical father in a heterosexual relationship in which the literal application of VA.
CODE §§ 20-158(A)(3) and 32.1-257(D) barred the intended biological father from
establishing legal parentage to his child because (1) he was not married to the
birth mother and (2) he was a ‘donor’ because the child was the result of assisted
conception).
58. After examining the parentage and adoption statutes of Tennessee, the Tennes-
see Supreme Court in In re C.K.G. concluded that such statutes were not control-
ling in a contest over maternal rights because “the parentage statutes generally
fail to contemplate dispute over maternity.” In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 723
(Tenn. 2005).
59. The author’s use of the qualifier “nontraditional” is descriptive, not normative.
Some individuals have objected to the use of qualifiers such as “nontraditional” or
“same-sex” as implying a deviation from normal.  Professor Barbara Cox, Califor-
nia Western School of Law, as a Discussant in the Discussion Group: How the
Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships is Transforming Family Law Pedagogy
and Scholarship at Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Conference
(July 31, 2012). See also Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52
DUKE L.J. 1077, 1155–66 (2003) (“Forcing all families to conform to a single
model harms all members of the unit.”).
60. The Pennsylvania Superior Court applied the doctrine of in loco parentis to ac-
knowledge three parents, namely a same-sex partner of biological mother, the
biological mother and the biological father (the biological father allowed his
sperm to be used by the mother but did not relinquish his parental rights as a
true sperm donor would). See Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Re-
flections on the Financial Implications of Multiple Parentage, 16 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 217, 230 (2010) (citing Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2007) [hereinafter Jacobs, More Parents].
61. Linda S. Anderson, Protecting Parent-Child Relationships: Determining Parental
Rights of Same-Sex Parents Consistently Despite Varying Recognition of Their Re-
lationship, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 1 (2006); Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives,
Which Came First the Parent or the Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305 (2010); Kris-
tine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM,
899 (2012); Olga V. Kotlyarevskaya & Sara B. Poster, Separation Anxiety Among
California Courts: Addressing the Confusion over Same-Sex Partners’ Parentage
Claims, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 153 (2006); John G. New, “Aren’t You
Lucky You Have Two Mamas?”: Redefining Parenthood in Light of Evolving Re-
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comes muddled in constitutional tangles,62 in shifting mores,63 in
quagmires of evolving and inconsistent legal parameters on what con-
stitutes a “family,”64 in political debates over the Uniform Parentage
productive Technologies and Social Change, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773 (2006);
Kelly M. O’Bryan, Mommy or Daddy and Me: A Contract Solution to a Child’s
Loss of the Lesbian or Transgender Nonbiological Parent, 60 DEPAUL L. REV.
1115 (2011); Nancy D. Polikoff, Response: And Baby Makes . . . How Many? Using
In Re M.C. to Consider Parentage of a Child Conceived Through Sexual Inter-
course and Born to a Lesbian Couple, 100 GEO. L.J. 2015 (2012); Dara E. Purvis,
Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210
(2012); Kimberly M. Surratt Esq., Parenthood Through Technology, NEV. LAW.,
Mar. 2007, at 8; Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibili-
ties of Egg Donors in Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 NW. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 167 (2008); Christen Blackburn, Note, Who is a Mother? Determining
Legal Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. REV.
349 (2009); Kira Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else’s Basket:
Inserting Uniformity into the Uniform Parentage Act’s Treatment of Assisted Re-
production, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 671 (2007); Emmalee M. Miller, Note, Are
You My Mother? Missouri Denies Custodial Rights to Same-Sex Parent, 75 MO. L.
REV. 1377 (2010).
62. When addressing a parentage dispute between a birth mother and biological
mother, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Florida recently held that the biolog-
ical mother had “constitutionally protected parental rights to the child,” and
thus, if FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (which effectively denied parental rights to the biolog-
ical mother) applied to the situation presented, the statute was unconstitutional.
See T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla. 2013).  The majority
opinion certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as being
of great public importance:
Does the application of section 742.14 to deprive parental rights to a les-
bian woman who provided her ova to her lesbian partner so both women
could have a child to raise together as equal partners and who did parent
the child for several years after its birth render the statute unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection and Privacy clauses of the Federal and
State Constitutions?
Id. at 803.
63. Using the Disney Channel as a microcosm of the changing mores in America, it is
noteworthy that the 2014 (and final) season of Good Luck Charlie will break new
ground.  Michael Schneider, Exclusive: Disney Channel Breaks New Ground with
Good Luck Charlie Episode, TV GUIDE (June 20, 2013, 4:30 PM), www.tvguide.
com/news/disney-channel-same-sex-couple-1066972.aspx.  “In a first for the Dis-
ney Channel, next season an episode of Good Luck Charlie will feature a family
with two moms . . . [b]ut Disney Channel understands the groundbreaking nature
of featuring a same-sex couple on one of its sitcoms and took extra care in crafting
the episode.  ‘This particular storyline was developed under the consultancy of
child development experts and community advisors,’ a Disney Channel spokes-
person says.  ‘Like all Disney Channel programming, it was developed to be rele-
vant to kids and families around the world and to reflect themes of diversity and
inclusiveness.’” Id.
64. This Article suggests that resolving the definition of family is a distinct inquiry
from articulating the primary definition of parent.  Many related inquiries, how-
ever, in family law, trust law, business succession planning, charitable gifting,
and tax and estate planning must grapple with a workable definition of family.
See, e.g., Darra L. Hoffman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-By-State
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Act,65 and in the perceived need to reconcile conflicting state laws66
governing marriage, adoption, and surrogacy contracts.67  To escape
this muddle and proceed in a rational, coherent manner, we need a
return to the basics.68  Before reaching the all-inclusive definition of
parentage, we must identify the starting point of parentage.  Parents
are born with the birth of a child.  Notwithstanding the scientific
breakthroughs in reproductive technology and the more inclusive
modern understanding of the family unit,69 every child begins with
two (and only two) suppliers of genetic material and one (and only one)
gestational carrier.  Thus, the only logically clear starting point for a
legal definition of parentage begins with these three claim-holders to
parentage.  Once the examination of the concept of parentage is disen-
tangled from the complications of related, but logically independent,
legal questions,70 it becomes clear that unless and until the rights and
obligations of parentage are either (voluntarily) contractually waived
or (involuntarily) judicially terminated, the law must recognize as par-
Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 449, 450 (2009) (“ART . . . forces us to confront deeply held beliefs about
what makes a ‘mother’ or a ‘father’ . . . and perhaps most fundamentally, what
makes a ‘family’”).
65. See Nicole L. Parness, Forcing a Square into a Circle: Why Are Courts Straining
to Apply the Uniform Parentage Act to Gay Couples and Their Children?, 27
WHITTIER L. REV. 893 (2006) (addressing the misapplication of the Uniform Par-
entage Act by the California Supreme Court in K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005)).
66. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision
Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 847 (2003)
(noting that there exists “significant variation among the states as to just about
every aspect of family law at any given time,” a state of affairs unlikely to change
as “family law is so infused with social policy and moral belief”).
67. See generally Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of
Disharmony: Same-Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 563 (2009).
68. We have lost the proverbial trees in the forest of overarching and difficult consti-
tutional and conflict-of-laws issues.  Conceptual clarity is needed in the under-
standing of the roots of the individual tree.
69. A 2013 article, entitled Meet the Same-Sex Parents Next Door by Parenting Maga-
zine states, “In fact, a recent survey by the Pew Research Center and commis-
sioned by Time Magazine found that most Americans’ view of what constitutes a
family is loosening.  Three of five people said they view a same-sex couple with
kids as a family too.” Meet the Same-Sex Parents Next Door, PARENTING MAG.
(Jan. 11, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://m.parenting.com/entry/view/id/12340.
70. A cursory review of some of the leading casebooks designed for an introductory
class in family law reveals concurrent treatment of the evolving definition of
“family,” the debate over same-sex marriage and the ephemeral definition of
“parentage.” See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN
FAMILY LAW 449 (4th ed. 2010) (“Given different jurisdictions’ positions on same-
sex relationships, conflicting approaches to parentage are inevitable”).  While re-
lated, the legal definition of parentage should be independent of the legal defini-
tion of family.  Families are created; at their genesis is intent.  Parents are born
with the birth of a child.  Prior intent is not a necessary condition for biological
parentage.
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ent any individual (regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or marital
status) who is biologically related to a child.
Affirmation of the biological ties of genetics and gestation as the
starting point for parentage does not necessitate the converse:
namely, that biologically unrelated individuals are not parents.
Whether formally by adoption or surrogacy, or simply in fact, an indi-
vidual may “parent” in spite of the lack of biological tie or legal status
as a parent.71  The fundamental question is not whether parentage
should be awarded to those who parent irrespective of biological ties to
the child but rather whether parentage should ever be denied to one
who both acts as parent and is the genetic genesis of the child.  While
a biological link is not—and should not—be a necessary condition for
parentage,72 the genetic link coupled with the intent to parent should
be sufficient.73
B. K.M. v. E.G.: California Confronts the Problem
The first case to suggest that current parentage statutes fail to ac-
count for the changing family dynamic attributable to ART was K.M.
v. E.G.74  In this California case, K.M. and E.G., a lesbian couple, were
in a registered domestic partnership.75  Before and after entering into
71. Some scholars have lamented the retreat to a definition of fatherhood based
solely upon biology as undermining both the best interests of the child and family
stability. See generally Murphy, supra note 24.  This Article does not champion
parentage based solely upon biology.  Rather, it affirms an understanding of par-
entage that acknowledges the parentage of any biological parent who intends to
parent.
72. For cases where a man who acted as the father was treated as such even though
DNA testing showed he was not the biological dad, see In re Marriage of Buz-
zanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) (a paternity case in which a nonbio-
logical but functioning father who was married to the birth mother was held to
have superior rights to the man proven to be the biological father through DNA
testing) and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding by a plural-
ity, in a child custody/visitation case in which the plaintiff was proven to be the
biological father through DNA testing, challenged California’s statutory pre-
sumption that a child born to a wife cohabiting with her husband is the child of
the husband).
73. The high cost of producing a child with reciprocal in vitro fertilization (IVF) in
order to give a biological connection to both mothers is further evidence of the
intentionality of parentage by both mothers. See Wayne Kuznar, IVF Often Cho-
sen for Family Building in Same Sex Couples, THE OB/GYN NURSE-NP/PA, http:/
/www.theobgynnurse.com/content/ivf-often-chosen-family-building-same-sex-
couples (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).  “Reciprocal IVF is an option in which part-
ners reciprocate in their roles—1 partner undergoes ovarian stimulation and
serves as the oocyte source, and the other is the gestational mother, said Cun-
ningham.  The cost per cycle of reciprocal IVF is $21,000.” Id.
74. See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
75. Id. at 675.  Pursuant to Section 297 of the California Family Code, two single,
competent, unrelated, adult women may file a Declaration of Domestic Partner-
ship (Form NP/SF DP-1) with the Secretary of State, Domestic Partners Registry.
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the domestic partnership, E.G. underwent repeated unsuccessful
attempts at artificial insemination.76  K.M. was supportive of the pro-
creative attempts, accompanying E.G. to most of her doctor’s appoint-
ments.77  Despite attempts to have a child after entering into a
domestic partnership with K.M., E.G. insisted that she intended to
raise the child as a single parent.78  K.M. asserted the opposite, main-
taining that she and E.G. intended to raise the child together.79
While there was disagreement as to whether one or both women in-
tended to have parental rights in the child,80 there was no dispute
over the biological connection of each woman to the child.  After learn-
ing that E.G.’s failure to conceive was the result of her inability to
produce sufficient ova, E.G., at the suggestion of a fertility specialist,
underwent in vitro fertilization of embryos created from the ova of
K.M. and the sperm of an anonymous donor.81  Before K.M. had the
ova extracted, she was required to sign a donor form wherein she re-
linquished all rights to a child born as a result of the use of her ova.82
K.M. signed the form, knowing it to be a procedural hurdle83 and be-
lieving that the waiver provision did not apply to her situation be-
cause it was clear that she and E.G. intended to raise the child
together.84  The embryos were implanted, and E.G. ultimately gave
birth to twins.85  The children’s birth certificate listed E.G. as the only
parent,86 but in many other aspects of the children’s lives, both E.G.
and K.M. were identified as their mother.87  Eventually, the relation-
ship between E.G. and K.M. soured, and K.M. filed an action in the
Superior Court of Marin County, California, to have the court estab-
California’s regulation of registered domestic partnerships was not altered by
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
76. K.M., 117 P.3d at 675–76.





82. K.M. signed the ovum donation consent form approximately one month prior to
the procedure. Id.
83. Before performing the invasive procedure of removing ova, reproductive clinics,
largely for their own protection from liability, require the execution of consent
forms.  The consent form signed by K.M. was printed on the letterhead of the
University of California at San Francisco Medical Center. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The limitations of fill-in-the-blank forms should not be determinative of par-
entage.  Just as marriage licenses in some states have been modified to remove
the gender-specific titles of “husband” and “wife” in favor of the gender-neutral
“spouse 1” and “spouse 2,” birth certificates could provide for three possible bio-
logical parents.  Rachel Katz, Miami Judge Allows 3 Names on Birth Certificate,
ABC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/
02/miami-judge-allows-3-names-on-birth-certificate/.
87. K.M., 117 P.3d at 676–77.
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lish her legal parental rights in the children.88  The trial court con-
cluded that E.G.’s execution of the ovum donation form relegated her
to the conceptual equivalent of a sperm donor, thus stripping her of
any legal rights to a child born through the use of her ova.89  The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, concluding that, at the time of
conception, the parties contemplated E.G. as the sole parent of the
child.90  The court noted that any action taken by the parties in bring-
ing the children into their joint home and jointly parenting them was
immaterial to establishing a parent–child relationship between K.M.
and the children.91  The court foreclosed reliance upon other legal doc-
trines to establish K.M.’s rights in the children by declaring that the
only path to legal parentage for K.M. was adoption.92  The California
Supreme Court reversed.93
The California Supreme Court held that parentage under Califor-
nia law is governed by California’s version of the Uniform Parentage
Act94 unless there is an applicable statutory exception that would
draw the decision out of the scope of the Act.95  California Family
Code § 7613(b) provides that “a man is not a father if he provides se-
men to a physician to inseminate a woman who is not his wife.”96  The
lower courts expanded the scope of this sperm-donor statute to include
a woman who donates her ova and concluded that, in light of the
waiver K.M. signed, § 7613(b) applied to place K.M. in the role of a
donor.97  Once categorized as donor, it followed that K.M. possessed no
parental rights.  The California Supreme Court, without commenting
on the lower court’s expansion of the sperm-donor statute, simply con-
cluded that § 7613(b) “does not apply under the circumstances of this
case in which K.M. supplied ova to impregnate her lesbian partner in
order to produce children who would be raised in their joint home.”98
Simply put, the supreme court allowed K.M.’s actions, which negated
her being a donor, to trump the waiver form, which labeled K.M. a
donor.  Having determined that the donor exception was inapplicable
and, therefore, did not serve to deprive K.M. of her parental rights in
88. K.M., 117 P.3d at 677.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.  One who acts as a parent to a child with whom there is no biological connec-
tion is referred to as a de facto parent.  On the facts, K.M. was a de facto parent.
Id. at 676–77.
92. Id. at 677–78.
93. Id. at 682.
94. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600–7720 (West 2013).
95. K.M., 117 P.3d at 678; see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (hold-
ing donor exception inapplicable and determining maternity under the Uniform
Parentage Act).
96. K.M., 117 P.3d at 675 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613).
97. Id. at 677–78.
98. Id. at 681.
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the children, the supreme court applied the law of the Uniform Par-
entage Act.99  In so doing, it held that E.G. had offered sufficient evi-
dence of a parent–child relationship in that she was the gestational
mother.100  Likewise, K.M. offered sufficient evidence of a par-
ent–child relationship as the genetic mother of the children.101  Thus,
given that the children were raised in the parties’ joint home, and
were loved and nurtured by both parties, the supreme court found
that E.G. and K.M. were both legal mothers of the children.102  While
the existing statutory scheme of California failed to address the par-
entage question posed by these facts, the California Supreme Court
chose to embrace “genetic consanguinity” for the finding of maternity
as well as paternity.103
The California Supreme Court struggled to reach its conclusion—a
correct conclusion—that an egg donor was not, in fact, a donor.104
The widely accepted ART terminology meant to describe the science of
the origin of the genetic material has unnecessarily incorporated the
over-inclusive definition of “donor.”  The lower court held that K.M.
was deemed to have waived her parental rights to her egg once it was
removed from her body and used in ART.105  Colloquially speaking,
K.M. donated her egg to her infertile partner E.G.  Yet such a charac-
terization is loaded with inapplicable nuances, which should not be
determinative of parental rights.  Advances in reproductive technolo-
gies have antiquated the once-precise terminology of donor.  Not all
transferors of genetic material are donors within the meaning of the
California sperm-donor statute.106
The single term “donor” has been rendered ambiguous by the
plethora of applications of artificial insemination.  The need to clarify
legal terminology in light of scientific advances is not without prece-
dent.107  Clarification of the term donor is urgently needed in order to
99. Id.
100. Id. at 680.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 680–81.
103. Id. at 678–79 (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (finding the
sperm-donor statute did not apply to cut off the parental rights accorded under
the Uniform Parentage Act to a married couple who acted as the ovum and sperm
providers to a gestational surrogate, as the couple “intended to procreate a child
genetically related to them by the only available means”).
104. Id. at 682.
105. See id.
106. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2013).
107. The single term “surrogacy” became inadequate to differentiate between the legal
status of an intended mother who was technically a surrogate to someone else’s
donated egg and a rented womb.  Multiple terms became necessary to differenti-
ate the legal status among those engaged in the scientific procedure of receiving a
fertilized egg for gestation whether parentage of the resulting child was intended
or not.  A birth mother can have one of four different relationships to the unfer-
tilized egg: (1) her egg—which she intends to parent; (2) her egg—to which she
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differentiate between the two categories of egg/sperm providers for
ART, namely, “true donors” and what I would call “intentional lenders
of procreative genetic material.”  The duality of meanings for the sin-
gle term donor has a disparate impact depending upon the gender of
the donor.  Where the genetic provider is male, retention of the status
of father can be achieved (and therefore overcomes the over-inclusive
label of donor) either by virtue of the man’s marriage to the woman
who bears the child or by virtue of a surrogacy contract.108  Where the
genetic provider is female, however, there is no avenue to motherhood
via the relationship to the woman who bears the child.  The only way
to avoid donor status for a female intentional lender of procreative ge-
netic material is through a surrogacy arrangement, and that is availa-
ble only if it is permitted by statute.109
Broadly speaking, donors and donations are not the concern of
family law.  The term donor as used in the parentage context is bor-
rowed from the law of gratuitous transfers.  Strictly speaking, a donor
is one who not only parts with possession of her property, but who also
relinquishes to the donee all present and future dominion and control
over it.110  A present interest donation is irrevocable.  Once completed
as evidenced by delivery and acceptance, the donor’s rights to the
donated property are severed.  The donor claims no right to possess,
enjoy, or exercise dominion and control over the property; nor is the
donor financially obligated for its future maintenance.  Unfortunately,
the terms “egg donor” and “sperm donor” encompass far more than
true reproductive donation.
Though labeled as an egg donor by the lower court,111 K.M. was
not engaged in reproductive donation; she was procreating with her
life partner.112  The nuances of donating were absent.  K.M. was, in-
stead, an egg lender.  K.M.’s interest was not being transferred to and
surrenders parental rights as a “true” donor; (3) not her egg—she gestates the
child she will parent; and (4) not her egg—she performs service of gestation with
no intention of parenting.
108. Linguistic clarification of the donor/lender distinction would refine the conversa-
tion about parental rights in the context of private sperm donation. See generally
Lauren Gill, Who’s Your Daddy?  Defining Paternity Rights in the Context of Free,
Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715 (2013).
109. By statute, surrogacy laws may be limited to a “commissioning couple,” which
incorporates the state’s definition of marriage to limit the access to parentage.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2013), supra note 32 and accompanying text.
110. 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 1 (2013).
111. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 677 (Cal. 2005).
112. The failure of our limited ART terminology results in K.M. (the biological mother)
being pegged as an egg donor.  Could not E.G. (her partner and the gestational
mother) have been equally pegged as a surrogate for K.M.’s biological child?
Neither label is accurate.  Each of K.M. and E.G. is, rather simply, a mother, and,
more specifically, a biological mother.  Each possesses a physical as well as an
intentional tie to the child.
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replaced by E.G.’s interest.  K.M. fully retained her expectation to ac-
cess, enjoy, and exercise dominion over the resulting child.113  Addi-
tionally, K.M. intended and demonstrated financial responsibility for
the child.  All consequences of “ownership” of her egg remained with
K.M.114
In the context of parentage, surrogates, egg donors, and sperm do-
nors are perceived as sometimes necessary building blocks for procrea-
tion, but not as the primary architects.  They are facilitators of
parentage.  Though unstated, the status as surrogate or donor comes
with the qualifier “merely,” and true parentage lies elsewhere.  The
introduction of the terms “egg lender” and “sperm lender” to our ART
language would remove any actual or subliminal prejudice against the
lender’s claim to parentage.115
C. T.M.H. v. D.M.T.: Florida Confronts the Problem with a
Different Initial Outcome
In a case of first impression within the state, the courts of Flor-
ida116 have joined the quest for an understanding of parentage in
which old statutes can be reconciled with modern reproductive reali-
ties.  In the case of T.M.H. v. D.M.T., on which the introductory hypo-
thetical is based, D.M.T. and T.M.H. enjoyed a committed same-sex
relationship.117  The couple decided to have a child together, a child
that they would jointly parent and raise.118  When the couple learned
that D.M.T. was infertile, her partner provided her ovum to enable
D.M.T. to conceive the couple’s child.119  Upon the birth of the child,
both women held themselves out as mothers of the child.120  The child
113. K.M., 117 P.3d at 681 (noting that “K.M. does not claim to be the twins’ mother
instead of E.G., but in addition to E.G.,” the Supreme Court distinguishes the
case from Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (cited for the proposition
that “for any child California law recognizes only one natural mother”)).
114. Perhaps the best analogy offered by the law of gratuitous transfers is that of a
joint interest.  Both the grantor and the grantee of a joint interest are equal own-
ers of that property interest, each with full access to the whole of the property
and the presumption of equal financial contribution.  By analogy, both the origi-
nator of the egg (the egg “lender”) and the gestational mother recipient should be
equal parents of the resulting child.
115. By changing the terminology, we not only remove genetic lenders from the reach
of sperm-donor statutes, we also reevaluate preconceived—or perhaps uninten-
tional—legal conclusions.  Consider, for example, the following quote that sug-
gests that the common law doctrine of nullius filius needed reevaluation: “[T]here
are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate parents.”  Kaur v. Chawla, 522 P.2d
1198, 1199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
116. See T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla. 2013).
117. Id. at 788.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 788–89.
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bore a hyphenated last name, and both women loved and provided for
the child in their joint home.121
When the relationship between the women deteriorated, the child
resided with the gestational mother; the genetic mother paid regular
child support and received equal parenting time with the child.122
Eventually, however, the amicable split turned bitter, and the gesta-
tional mother withheld the child from her other mother.123  The ge-
netic mother ultimately learned that the gestational mother had
moved to Australia with the child.124  The genetic mother filed an ac-
tion in the circuit court of Brevard County, Florida, requesting the
court to establish her legal rights and responsibilities with respect to
the child upon finding that she is the child’s biological mother.125  The
trial court dismissed the action, holding that the Florida statute ad-
dressing the donation of genetic material was applicable to relegate
T.M.H. to the status of a donor because the statute precludes a same-
sex couple from qualifying as a commissioning couple.126  Under the
Florida statute, only if T.M.H. and D.M.T. met the definition of a com-
missioning couple, a heterosexual couple, could T.M.H. have donated
her genetic material without being involuntarily locked into the role of
a donor.127
121. Id.




126. The use of gender-specific terms throughout Florida’s Determination of Parent-
age statutes precludes the State of Florida from recognizing more than, at most,
one man and one woman as parents of a child.  Had T.M.H. been a male domestic
partner of D.M.T. whose sperm was used in the insemination, he would have
been recognized as the father under Florida law.  Had T.M.H. been an infertile
male domestic partner of D.M.T., he could have adopted the child under a
preplanned adoption agreement under FLA. STAT. § 63.212 (2011).  While the law
of all fifty states permits LGBT individual adoptions, only twenty-two states
clearly permit second-parent adoption by a lesbian partner of the birth mother
(Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Washington).  Five states prohibit second-parent adoption (Kentucky,
Nebraska, Ohio, Utah and Wisconsin).  In the remaining states, the law is
unclear.
127. “The Final Order Granting Summary Judgment [to the gestational mother
D.M.T.] found, among other things, that ‘the law [of Florida] does not recognize
the rights of the biological mother versus a birth mother;’ that ‘an agreement or
contract between the parties, and/or previous course of conduct, does not create
any rights in the [biological mother] to the minor child;’ and that ‘Florida law
does not provide any protection’ for a party in the biological mother’s position,
[namely, a mother who is vying for parental rights when another mother, the
birth mother, already has such rights]. (R 303-04).”  Appellee’s Answer Brief at 3
n.2, D.M.T. v. T.M.H., No. SC12-261 (Fla. May 14, 2012), available at http://www.
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The trial judge, who openly expressed displeasure with his ruling,
noted, “I do not agree with the current state of the law, but I must
uphold it.  I believe the law is not caught up with science nor the state
of same-sex marriages.  I do think that is on the horizon.”128  On ap-
peal, the concerns of the trial court were addressed.  The district court
of appeal reversed, finding that Florida’s egg-donor statute did not an-
ticipate and was not intended to apply to the unique situation where a
woman, in a committed lesbian relationship, allows her eggs to be
combined with sperm from an anonymous donor to create embryos to
be implanted in her lesbian partner so the couple can bear a child with
whom both women have a maternal link and who will be parented
jointly by both women in the same home.129  The court held that,
under the extraordinary facts of this case, “we can discern no legally
valid reason to deprive either woman of parental rights to this
child.”130
It is noteworthy that the opinion of the District Court of Appeal of
the State of Florida identified the child in the opening sentence of the
majority opinion as being “born out of [the] relationship [between the
biological mother T.M.H. and the birth mother D.M.T.]”131  While it is
traditional for us to think of children as being born out of relation-
ships (whether legalized or not, long-term, casual, or singular), it ex-
pands the traditional usage of the phrase to so reference the child of a
same-sex couple.  Until the advancement of ART, a same-sex couple
could bring a child “into” their relationship (in actuality, if not legally),
but it was not possible for a child to be born “out of” that
relationship.132
In arriving at its decision, the court of appeal reasoned that the
egg-donor statute, as applied to the couple, was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the woman’s fundamental rights to procreate and to
parent one’s child as protected by the Florida and United States Con-
stitutions.133  The court went on to say that interpretation of the stat-
ute in a manner that deprived the appellant of these rights because
she was in a same-sex rather than a heterosexual relationship vio-
floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/12/12-261/Filed_05-14-
2012_Answer_Brief.pdf.
128. T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 789–90.
129. Id. at 790.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 787.
132. The linguistic connotations of “into” parallels the mechanism of adoption.  The
parent or parents bring an external child into the family.  The linguistic connota-
tions of “out of” parallels traditional parentage through birth.  The child
originates from within the existing relationship of the parents.
133. T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 792–93, 800.
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lated equal protection and privacy protections under the state and fed-
eral constitutions.134
The gestational mother has appealed the decision of the intermedi-
ate court to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida.135  The parties
and the amici continue to couch the determination of parental rights
in constitutional terms.  The appellant/gestational mother maintains
her position that the Florida egg-donor statute is determinative.136
As the two women could not be a “commissioning couple,” the appellee/
genetic mother could not legally assume any role other than the do-
nor.137  The appellant argues that, as the birth mother of the couple’s
child, she is the child’s biological parent.  Thus, forcing her to share
parental rights with her lesbian partner would violate her privacy
rights as well as her constitutional rights to the “love and companion-
ship of a birth child.”138  The appellant cloaks the parentage question
in the state’s public policy against same-sex relationships.  Noting
Florida’s prohibition against same-sex marriage and joint same-sex
adoptions, the appellant argues that it would be inconsistent with
Florida’s stance on same-sex relationships to grant parental rights to
both women in this case.139
The factual scenarios presented in K.M. v. E.G. and T.M.H. v.
D.M.T. highlight that the current statutory law of California and Flor-
ida, respectively, fails to anticipate and cannot accommodate the
unique parentage questions presented by modern families.  The laws
of Florida and California recognized the gestational mother as a natu-
ral parent of the child born to the relationship140 and acknowledged
the sperm donor’s waiver of rights and responsibilities with respect to
the child,141 but there was no statutory basis for vesting rights and
responsibilities to the child with the biological mother who nurtured,
loved, and raised the child.  Had the question of parentage arisen in
134. Id. at 800.
135. Notice of Appeal, D.M.T. v. T.M.H., No. SC12-261 (Fla. Feb. 10, 2012), available
at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/12/12-261/
Filed_02-10-2012_Notice_Of_Appeal.pdf.  The state high court affirmed the part
of the appellate court decision relevant to this Article.  No. SC12-261, 2013 WL
5942278 (Fla. 2013).
136. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787 (Apr. 17, 2012) (No.
SC12-261).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 11.
139. See generally id.
140. See Elizabeth E. Swire Falker, The Disposition of Cryopreserved Embryos: Why
Embryo Adoption Is an Inapposite Model for Application to Third-Party Assisted
Reproduction, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 489, 501 (2009) (“In most states, well
established common law presumptions provide that a woman who gives birth to a
child will be deemed the legal and natural mother of that child.”).
141. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2011),
invalidated by T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla. 2013).
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the more traditional use of ART, in which one parent was both the
gestational mother and the genetic mother and the other parent was
the biological father who had intent to parent, state parentage stat-
utes would acknowledge the parent–child relationship between the
child and the genetic father.142  However, because the other intended
parent was a woman who was not the gestational mother, the parent-
age statutes applied literally relegated her to the status of a donor,
irrespective of her intent to parent her genetic child.
The absurdity of the statutory scheme that results in a genetic
mother’s possessing no legal rights as parent is demonstrated by the
following unique, but logically possible, set of facts.  Assume that Katy
and Kim are domestic partners.  They decide to have children to-
gether.  In order to maximize each mother’s closeness to the children,
they decide to engage in ART.  An egg removed from Katy will be fer-
tilized by an anonymous sperm donor and implanted into Kim who
will gestate and give birth to the child.  Concurrently, an egg will be
removed from Kim, fertilized by sperm from the same donor and im-
planted into Katy.  Based upon the lower court’s holding in T.M.H. v.
D.M.T.,143 only Katy would be a parent to Kim’s genetic child; only
Kim would be a parent to Katy’s genetic child.  And presumably, the
two children would possess no legal relationship to each other, in spite
of the fact that they are biologically related to the same three “par-
ents”: two as genetic suppliers and one as a gestational carrier.  Fur-
thermore, their lack of a legal sibling relationship would be in spite of
the fact that predating their respective conceptions, the children were
intended by the two functional parents to be siblings.144  As a mere
donor, the genetic mother is denied the legal parent–child relationship
with her child.  Thus, while an intended, genetic father can gain sta-
tus as a legal parent, an intended, genetic, nongestational mother can-
not.145  In both K.M v. E.G. and T.M.H. v. D.M.T., the courts
ultimately vested parental rights in the genetic mother.146  However,
the courts reached these results in spite of the law by extending statu-
tory schemes that were designed to permit such outcomes only when
the genetic parent seeking parental rights is the father of the child to
142. Paternity could be established by the marital parentage presumption or through
the biological link preserved in a parenting agreement negating donor status.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002).
143. T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 789–90.
144. See Natalie Amato, Essay, Black v. Simms: A Lost Opportunity to Benefit Chil-
dren by Preserving Sibling Relationships When Same-Sex Families Dissolve, 45
FAM. L.Q. 377, 378–79 (2011) (arguing that children have a right to continued
contact with half-siblings following the demise of their parents’ relationship).
145. In effect, the standard for legal parentage for an egg provider depends not on the
affirmative fact of biological connection but rather on the negative fact of not
being the gestational carrier.  For a man, not being the gestational carrier is
irrelevant.
146. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 802–03.
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include the parallel scenario when the genetic parent seeking parental
rights is the child’s other mother.147
Different standards for parentage have led to gender-based differ-
ences among genetic parents.  Intended parents who have a genetic,
but not gestational, connection to the child are in different legal posi-
tions depending on whether the genetic parent is a man or a woman.
Current parentage statutes provide several means by which an in-
tended father can establish parentage; however, these statutes are
often gender-specific and, consequently, not equally applicable to wo-
men as a means of establishing parental rights.148  Thus, for a court to
vest parental rights in a genetic mother, it must resort to constitu-
tional or statutory interpretation arguments.
It is the position of this author that the starting point of parentage
can be determined without ever reaching the constitutional argu-
ments being made to support the parentage of genetic nongestational
mothers in same-sex relationships.  These constitutional arguments
are clouding the real legal question, namely: who are the initial claim-
ants to parentage?  It is well-settled that there is a fundamental right
to procreate149 and to raise one’s children as the parents deem appro-
priate.150  However, these principles do not resolve the underlying
question of who qualifies as a parent.  As paternity statutes were orig-
inally developed to resolve questions of child legitimacy and lack any
discriminatory intent, constitutional gender-based equal protection
147. The Supreme Court of New York has also extended the reliance upon genetics to
maternity. See T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div.
2011).
148. For an exhaustive critique of the presumption of parentage for the partner of the
birth mother, see Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt, supra note 14, at
215.  In the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hamp-
shire, California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, New Jersey, and the District of
Columbia, “a female spouse or domestic/civil union partner of a woman who bears
a child receives the same presumption of parentage that a husband receives.” Id.
The paternity presumption in favor of the husband of the gestational mother es-
tablishes the probability of biological connection to the child. Id. at 216.  While
an extension of the paternity presumption to a same-sex partner like T.M.H. or
the other mother in the introductory hypothetical is an improvement to the state
of the law that denies her parentage, the position of T.M.H. is biological and cer-
tain, not mere probability.  “Parentage based on presumption requires no court
involvement; that is its strength.” Id.  Because the presumption of paternity is
tied to the legal status of the partner to birth mother, its extension to same-sex
partners is dependent upon the state’s recognition of same-sex couples. See, e.g.,
id. at 215 (quoting the Vermont statute as an example of how the states tie the
presumption to a legal marital or partnership status).  Parentage does not and
should not need to be tied to a state’s definition of marriage.
149. Eisentadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
150. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
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arguments would fail before the courts.151  The argument that the de-
termination of parentage should be different if a child is born of a
same-sex relationship versus a heterosexual relationship improperly
shifts the focus from the parent–child relationship to the nature of the
adult relationship.  Rather, when parentage is evaluated through the
lens of the adult’s relationship with the child, it becomes clear that
parentage can be determined without reference to the relationship be-
tween the adults out of whom the child was born.152
The absurdity of denying parentage to the genetic mother of our
introductory hypothetical is even more evident if we assume for a mo-
ment that she was not trying to establish her legal parental rights, but
rather was trying to avoid a parental support obligation.  Further, as-
sume she argues that despite her biological connection to the child and
her intent to parent, she should not be compelled to provide financial
support for the child whom she co-parented (for almost four years)
simply because she is a woman and state law relegates her to the sta-
tus of a donor. Certainly the courts would frown on such an attempt to
avoid parental responsibilities, as it would undoubtedly hold a man
who shares a genetic relationship with a child to a support obligation,
regardless of intent.153  However, the literal application of the parent-
age statutes of Florida as of 2013 would result in a woman who shares
a genetic relationship with a child, possesses the actual intent to par-
ent the child, and engages in the invasive, costly, and lengthy process
to conceive such child owing no support obligation to the resulting
child simply because (1) she is not the gestational mother and (2) she
is not married to the gestational mother.
The rights and obligations of parents are gender-neutral;154 our
legislators and judges must rectify statutory rules resulting in incon-
sistent outcomes based on gender.  Adherence to the law as it stands
both denies an egg lender parental rights and would foreclose a court
from imposing on a genetic mother in the position of K.M. or T.M.H. a
support obligation without first overturning (or ignoring) the law
151. Similarly, a criticism of the Parentage Decision Tree proposed in Part III, infra,
using a gender-based equal protection argument is not persuasive.  While the
Parentage Decision Tree may establish parentage for two women but not two
men, it remains scientifically impossible for a child to be born out of the relation-
ship between two men.  “The fact that a male is unable to be a gestational carrier
of the fertilized ovum is the result of biology, not discrimination[ ]” under the law.
L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 721 (Va. 2013).
152. As noted by the Florida District Court of Appeal in T.M.H. v. D.M.T., “[t]heir
separation does not dissolve the parental rights of either woman to the child, nor
does it dissolve the love and affection either has for the child.”  T.M.H. v. D.M.T.,
79 So. 3d 787, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No.
SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla. 2013).
153. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2011).
154. See generally ABBEY G. HAIRSTON, 2 CHILDREN & THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGA-
TIONS § 7:5 (2013).
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which labels her a donor.155  While not inconceivable, it would be un-
fortunate that a court would compel a genetic parent such as K.M. or
T.M.H. to pay parental support obligations while simultaneously de-
nying parental rights of visitation or joint custody.  The legal analysis
must be the same whether recognizing parental rights or enforcing
parental obligations, regardless of the gender of the parent.
III. THE UNINTENTIONAL GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM
Two glaring flaws present in the parentage statutes of most states
have created, albeit unintentionally, a statutory structure that may
deny an intended, genetic parent parental rights if that intended par-
ent is female but is not the child’s gestational mother.  The first defect
is the false conflict artificially created between gestational mother and
genetic mother.  A fit birth mother’s superior rights “vis-a`-vis a com-
plete stranger are one thing; her rights vis-a`-vis another” mother de-
mand different scrutiny.156  The second defect is the unequal legal
status of male and female genetic parents created by gender-specific
paternity statutes that present only male genetic parents with several
statutorily created means to establish parental rights in a child.157
Together, these two imperfections have mounted difficult legal obsta-
cles for an intended, genetic mother to secure her legal rights as par-
ent of a child she nurtures and supports unless she also gave birth to
the child.
A. The False Conflict Between the Genetic and the
Gestational Mother
Over time, a legal conflict between gestational and genetic mothers
appears to have been accepted without critical analysis.  In reality,
such a conflict does not exist.  Today, in the absence of surrogacy ar-
155. A donor is not required to support a child conceived through the use of her genetic
material.  Currently unfolding in the state of Kansas is a case involving William
Marotta, a man who supplied sperm to a lesbian couple pursuant to a private
contract that he thought waived his rights and obligations as parent to any child
conceived. Kansas Sperm Donor Asks for Judgment Without Trial, FOX NEWS
(July 25, 2013), www.foxnews.com/us/2013/07/25/kansas-sperm-donor-asks-for-
judgment-without-trial.  The state contends that the contract is invalid, making
Marotta (as the biological father) responsible for child support. Id.
156. The legal recognition of parentage must depend upon who is vying for the status.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 100–01 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added) (“[A] fit parent’s right vis-a`-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her
right vis-a`-vis another parent . . . may be another.”).
157. It is commonly regarded that the biological parents of a child “consist of the male
who sired the child and the female who gave birth to the child.” Parent,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parent (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
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rangements,158 the parentage statutes of all states identify the gesta-
tional mother as the natural mother of a child born to her.159  This
presumption, like others related to the notion of parentage, arose at a
time when there were no scientific capabilities available to affirm or
disavow parentage.  Thus, courts’ interpretations of parentage re-
flected the traditional family structure, including the presumption
that a gestational mother will bear her own biological child.160  As the
Tennessee Supreme Court noted in In re C.K.G., “[h]istorically, gesta-
tion proved genetic parentage beyond doubt, so it was unnecessary to
distinguish between gestational and genetic mothers.”161  These pre-
sumptions proved beneficial in resolving issues of parentage until soci-
etal values began to change, the image of the traditional family began
to yield to a more nontraditional composition, and ART enabled the
creation of children by means inconsistent with the traditional notions
of conception and parentage.  Despite these changes, courts have con-
tinued to apply the presumption of maternity in favor of the gesta-
tional mother,162 absent the existence of a surrogacy arrangement,
without due consideration of when and why the presumption arose or
the proper context for its application.  The end result is that the pre-
sumption continues to be afforded significance inconsistent with its
original intent.
The presumption that the gestational mother is the natural mother
of a child born to her was never intended to represent the legal defini-
tion of maternity.  In fact, it is nothing more than an evidentiary pre-
sumption designed to describe the genetic relationship between the
158. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West 2013) (excluding surrogate mothers
from the presumption that the woman who gives birth is the mother).
159. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (West 2013); see also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 2761 (2013) (providing in part that “the mother is deemed to be the woman who
gives birth to the child . . . .”).
160. However, as noted by the majority in T.M.H. v. D.M.T., it is overbroad to assert a
common law rule that the gestational mother is the sole legal mother.  T.M.H. v.
D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 787, 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla. 2013) .
161. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Kermit Roosevelt III,
The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the Concept of Parenthood,
39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 97 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here,
the Tennessee Supreme Court limited its holding to the facts of the case when it
held that the birth mother’s rights prevailed over the biological or egg donor’s
rights. Id. at 733.  It is important to note that this case did not involve “a contro-
versy between a gestational and a female genetic progenitor where the genetic
and gestative roles have been separated and distributed among two women . . . .”
Id.
162. Professor James Dwyer comments, “Perhaps the closest thing to a globally uni-
form rule in family law is that the woman who gives birth to a child is the child’s
first legal mother . . . .” JAMES DWYER, FAMILY LAW: THEORETICAL, COMPARATIVE,
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 25 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).
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adult and child.163  The preference for defining a child’s gestational
mother as its natural mother was intended to assign significance to
the genetic relationship between the mother and child.164  State par-
entage statutes that, as a matter of course, give preference to the ges-
tational mother over a genetic mother ignore the origin of the
presumption and the importance of the genetic relationship, thereby
creating a false conflict rooted in the flawed interpretation that the
gestational mother has a status superior to that of the genetic
mother.165  As long as the presumption is applied within the context of
the traditional family and traditional means of conception, it is suffi-
cient to establish the maternal relationship between a woman and a
child.  However, the presumption proves problematic when it is ap-
plied to scenarios involving ART where the genetic mother and the
gestational mother are not the same person.166  The presumption was
never intended to nor is it sufficient to answer questions of maternity
that arise outside of traditional ideas of conception.  However, if the
presumption is abandoned and the law returns to a point where em-
phasis is placed on the genetic relationship as a starting point for de-
termining parentage, such a shift can accommodate and resolve
questions of parentage in the face of nontraditional families and mod-
ern advances in reproductive technology.167
163. See Christen Blackburn, Note, Family Law—Who Is a Mother? Determining Le-
gal Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 349,
353 (2009).
164. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 316
(1990).
165. The jurisprudence of biological feminism emphasizes as the basis of maternity
the biological tie of mother and child in utero.  Professor Robin West wrote that a
pregnant woman’s “biological life embraces the embryonic life of another.” See
Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 210 (2000) (stating
that a pregnant woman’s “biological life embraces the embryonic life of another”);
see also Cahn, supra note 33, at 194–95 (quoting Barbara Katz Rothman, Daddy
Plants a Seed: Personhood Under Patriarchy, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1245
(1996)) (“The maternal tie is based on the growing of children; the patriarchal tie
is based on genetics, the seed connection.”).
166. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (This case presented a
custody battle between a gestational carrier and the genetic parents in which the
trial and appellate courts favored the genetic mother over the gestational mother,
defining legal parentage on the facts presented in terms of genetics.  The Su-
preme Court of California upheld the ruling but based its decision upon the pre-
conception intent of the genetic parents to create a child, giving them priority
over the gestational carrier who was only a facilitator of the birth.).
167. A preference for the gestational mother can be seen in feminist scholarship. See,
e.g., Tracey Higgins, Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State
Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1331–33 (1990) (noting a pref-
erence for the gestational mother but not necessarily addressing a choice between
the gestational mother and the genetic mother).
828 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:799
B. The Disparate Legal Avenues to Parentage Based upon
Gender-Specific Paternity Statutes
Just as the law created a presumption of maternity in the birth
mother, the law created a presumption of paternity in her husband
with respect to any child she bears during the marriage.168  This pre-
sumption was even more limited in applicability than the presumption
of maternity because traditionally it was applied only in situations
where the birth mother was married.169  As out-of-wedlock births be-
came a more common occurrence,170 states came to realize that this
narrow presumption was useless in determining many issues of pater-
nity.171  With only this presumption to apply to questions of paternity,
a child born out of wedlock had no legal father.172  Additionally, if a
married woman bore a child during the marriage but the woman’s
husband was not the father, there was no legal mechanism by which
the husband could challenge the paternity if he believed that he was
not the father.
In an effort to afford children born out of wedlock the opportunity
to be supported by two legal parents, states began to enact statutory
measures that would allow men who had fathered children out of wed-
lock to establish legal parental rights in these children.173  The pre-
sumption that the husband of a married woman is the father of a child
born to the marriage became rebuttable, both allowing a husband to
challenge paternity and allowing the actual father to assert pater-
nity.174  Now, all states have some means of establishing paternity for
children born out of wedlock, such as a parentage petition filed in the
168. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002).
169. See, e.g., Vetten v. Wallace, 39 Ill. App. 390 (App. Ct. 1890); Easley v. Gordon, 51
Mo. App. 637 (Ct. App. 1892); Kessler v. Anonymous, 18 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Just. Ct.
1940); Allen v. Hunnicutt, 52 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1949); see also Home of Holy In-
fancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. 1965) (noting that in the states of
Illinois, Missouri, New York, and Texas, respectively, there was no common law
duty on a putative father as legal parent to support a child born out of wedlock).
170. According to data compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics, in 2011,
40 percent of all births in America were to unwed women, an increase from 33
percent in 2000 and 18 percent in 1980.  Joyce A. Martin et al., Births Final Data
for 2011, 62 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 1 (2013), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01_tables.pdf.
171. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, Legal Paternity (and
Other Parenthood) After Lehr and Michael H., 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 225, 225–26
(2012) (discussing the clash that results when the marital paternity presumption
and blood tests assign legal paternity to two different men).
172. Such a child was termed nullius filius.  State v. Chavez, 82 P.2d 900 (N.M. 1938).
173. See, e.g., In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 598–99 (Tenn. 2010).
174. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002); TENN. CODE ANN § 36-2-304
(West 2010).
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appropriate court.175  Many states have also established a putative fa-
ther registry, which entitles a properly registered “presumed” father
to notification of and the right to intervene in many court proceedings
related to the child, such as the termination of parental rights or adop-
tion actions.176
For the purpose of this Article, the critical point is that state legis-
latures corrected the shortcomings in the law by enacting legislation
that addressed issues of paternity arising outside of the traditional
marital relationship and provided legal avenues allowing intended fa-
thers to establish legal, parental rights.177  While undoubtedly neces-
sary to establish dual parentage for children born out-of-wedlock, the
legislation was limited in its focus and application.  As the family
structure continues to evolve and ART has produced a variety of new
ways of conception, these gender-specific paternity statutes fall short.
The end result is that, in many states, there are no statutorily created
mechanisms that allow women to establish parentage.178  Thus, while
men can establish parentage either through an evidentiary presump-
tion or through remedial legislation, legal maternal rights are vested
either by the evidentiary presumption of birth (which yields only one
biological mother to the exclusion of all other claimants) or by a surro-
gacy contract (which overcomes the evidentiary presumption of mater-
nity and awards maternity according to the contract).179  Paternity
statutes, while well intentioned, have placed genetic parents in very
different legal positions.
IV. THE PARENTAGE DECISION TREE: A CONCEPTUAL
MODEL FOR STATE PARENTAGE STATUTES
For the majority of the children born in this country, neither the
false conflict between the gestational mother and the genetic mother
nor the inapplicability to women of biologically based paternity stat-
175. UNIFORM PARENTING ACT § 301 (amended 2002).  A child’s birth mother and a
man claiming to be the genetic father may sign an acknowledgment of paternity.
Id.
176. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (West 2010).
177. UNIFORM PARENTING ACT § 301 (amended 2002).
178. Some courts have judicially extended the paternity statutes to cases of maternity.
See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666–67 (Cal. 2005) (establish-
ing that a child’s two parents can both be women and applying state statutes
regarding father–child relationships to mother–child relationships).  Can the
wording here be changed to say, “apply to mother–child relationships state stat-
utes regarding father–child relationships”?
179. The logically necessary corollary to same-sex marriage is the extension of the
marital presumption of paternity to a marital presumption of parentage for the
birth mother’s spouse, irrespective of gender. See Susan Frelich Appleton,
Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex
Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2006).
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utes is of any consequence because these flaws in the law do not im-
pact traditional family cases.  However, there has been a steady
increase in the number of nontraditional families in recent years,180
and the law cannot continue to ignore the efforts of adults in these
families to gain status as a legal parent.  In these situations, the un-
fortunate consequence of imperfect parentage models is that states no
longer have a reliable starting point for determining parentage.
States can overcome many of the shortcomings of current parentage
statutes and presumptions by developing a more inclusive parentage
model that places intended, genetic parents on the same playing field,
regardless of gender.  This can be achieved by returning to the essence
of the parent–child relationship—genetics.  As Professor Nancy Poli-
koff once noted, “genetic connection is neither necessary or sufficient
for legal parentage.”181  However, a parentage decision tree182 based
on biology offers conceptual clarity to the diverse pool of claimants to
parentage.  Using the genetic relationship as a foundation for parent-
age, states should adopt gender-neutral parentage statutes that as-
sess parentage in terms of both biology and intent to parent.183
Adoption by the states of a properly ordered gender-neutral par-
entage decision tree would be more inclusive of the ever-changing
family dynamic and of the scientific, reproductive advances.  It would
be sufficient to resolve almost all initial determinations of parentage
while doing so in a manner that treats all genetic parents equally,
irrespective of gender.  The basic structure of the parentage decision
tree begins with the child and assigns parentage in the following hier-
archy: Genetic Parent #1; Genetic Parent #2; Gestational Parent.184
From this starting point, Genetic Parent #1 or Genetic Parent #2 may
waive rights to the child or opt out of parentage.  This would be done
180. Doris Nhan, Census: More in U.S. Report Nontraditional Households, NAT’L J.
(May 1, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/demographics/
census-more-in-u-s-report-nontraditional-households-20120430.
181. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt, supra note 14, at 202 (noting that
ART, adoption, and statutory and common law presumptions all assign parent-
age to individuals possessing no biological tie to the child).
182. The proposed decision tree would determine “formal” as opposed to “functional”
parenthood.  For a discussion of the difference, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles &
Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a Differentiated
Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419 (2013).
183. The intent to parent is, arguably, stronger in the case of two biological mothers
using ART than in the case of the biological father and mother of a child con-
ceived the old-fashioned way where imperfect contraception and impaired judg-
ment sometimes trump the nonreproductive intent behind the sex act.
184. The biological connection for the father may be established with scientific proof or
via the parentage presumption.  In Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139,
1140 (Cal. 1998), a temporary sexual partner of a married woman who reunited
with her husband was denied standing to challenge the paternity of married wo-
man’s husband who was serving as father to the child, cited in Polikoff, supra
note 61, at 2027–28.
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by embracing the true donor status as a mere supplier of genetic mate-
rial to others who intend to parent.  Likewise, the Gestational Parent
may, through an enforceable surrogacy arrangement, waive her status
as parent.  If the biological parentage decision tree fails to supply
fewer than two parents for a child,185 the determination of parentage
may then be supplemented by various legal constructs such as adop-
tion, de facto parentage, and intent-based models of parentage.  Each
parentage position is filled or eliminated without reference to the gen-
der of the individual occupying the position.  Moreover, biological par-
ents should not have to prove their intent to parent; such intent is
presumed under the proposed parentage decision tree.186
This proposed parentage decision tree poses no problem for the
traditional family—the genetic mother (also the gestational mother)
and the genetic father would simply fill the first two positions as Ge-
netic Parent #1 and Genetic Parent #2.  The real value in this parent-
age decision tree, however, is that it resolves the parentage question
in the more nontraditional situations by taking into account both ge-
netics and intent to parent.  More specifically, this paradigm recog-
nizes a gender-neutral distinction between a donor and a lender of
genetic material.  Under most current parentage statutes, a man can
donate his genetic material without incurring obligations to any re-
sulting child, and a man whose wife receives the donated sperm will
be considered the natural father of the child as long as he consented to
the insemination process.187  However, current laws do not permit a
female to serve as anything other than an egg donor, which becomes
an issue when the couple intending to parent a child is a lesbian
couple.
This was the exact situation before the trial court in T.M.H. v.
D.M.T.188  When D.M.T. allowed her egg to be used in the creation of
an embryo to be implanted in her partner, the law recognized no sta-
tus for her other than that of a donor, despite her intent to parent the
185. For a discussion supporting the removal of a quantitative limit on the number of
individuals the law deems to be a parent, see Jacobs, More Parents, supra note
60.  Professor Jacobs argues that, in light of the changing family structure and an
increasing departure from the two-parent paradigm, there is no reason the law
should limit a child to only two legal parents.  Professor Jacob states, “I previ-
ously argued that courts should not be bound by the number ‘two’; rather, courts
should allocate full legal parentage to more than two parents if the circumstances
warrant allocation.” Id. at 222; see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the
Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 25–26 (2008) (advocating for the recognition of
multiple parents and demonstrating how family law already acknowledges the
divisibility of parental roles among a variety of qualified persons).
186. See Knaplund, supra note 61, at 902 n.22.
187. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2010) (amended in 2013 to reflect gender-neu-
tral “spouse” term).
188. T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla. 2013).
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child.189  By removing the gender descriptor from the positions in the
proposed parentage decision tree, the law will recognize donors and
lenders of genetic material, regardless of gender.  In turn, this will
allow a woman who has the intent to parent a child with her partner
to use her genetic material in the creation of the child while the other
partner serves as the gestational mother.  Considering this situation
in the context of the parentage decision tree, the biological mother
would fill the position of “Genetic Parent #1.”  “Genetic Parent #2”
would be eliminated because of the couple’s use of the sperm of a true
donor.  The gestational mother would then fill the “Gestational Par-
ent” position as the second parent.
The use of the term “lender” to refer to an individual who, with
intent to parent, permits their genetic material to be used in the crea-
tion of a child is calculated and deliberate.  The term is significant
because it implies that the person permitting the use of genetic mate-
rial is not surrendering parental rights.190  “Lender” suggests that the
person whose genetic material is used to create an embryo expects to
get something in return.  The term represents the biological connec-
tion and the intent to parent, thereby distinguishing this individual
from a true donor, who has no intent to parent.  In practice, a lender
would authorize the use of genetic material in the conception of a child
with the expectation that the lender would retain legal parental rights
and legal obligations in the child.
The adoption of the parentage decision tree as the starting point of
parentage does not negate the legitimacy of other avenues to parent-
age, but it relegates these other avenues to a logically secondary posi-
tion.191  Application of the proposed parentage decision tree would
guarantee primary parentage, as opposed to derivative parentage,192
to all claim holders for parentage who bear a biological relation to the
child.193  The parentage decision tree will necessarily yield two or
189. Id. at 789.
190. Some statutes recognize that not all egg donors are donors but have failed to offer
an affirmative label such as lender. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-19-01(3)
(West 2011) (defining “donor” as “a woman whose body produces an egg for the
purposes of assisted conception but does not include a woman whose body pro-
duces an egg used for the purpose of conceiving a child for that woman”).
191. See In re M.C., 195 Cal. App. 4th 197, 222–23 (Ct. App. 2011) (recognizing that a
child may have three presumed parents, namely, a biological mother, a presumed
mother, and a biological father).
192. For the purposes of this Article, the term “derivative” is limited to describe only a
chronological secondary position, not a moral or de facto secondary position.  This
term is borrowed from the usage of “derivative” in the theory of derivative citizen-
ship and the derivative domicile rule, which was used to link a woman’s domicile
to that of her husband’s. See Kerry Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 101 CAL. L. REV.
407, 413–15 (2013).
193. The perception of the secondary nature of the de facto parent label (which is, by
definition, nonbiological) can be seen in Nolan v. LaBree, 52 A.3d 923 (Me. 2012).
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three biological parents,194 some or all of whom may have voluntarily
waived parental rights to the child or had such rights terminated by a
judicial proceeding.  Compliance with traditional adoption laws and
surrogacy arrangements, as well as the reliance on legal presumptions
of parentage, are available to fill any parenting voids.195  States must
then determine whether the rights and responsibilities of legal par-
entage should be conveyed to additional individuals under doctrines of
de facto parenting,196 intentional parenting,197 presumed parent-
age,198 “gestational fathering,”199 co-parenting,200 psychological
parenting,201 or voluntary acknowledgements of parentage (VAPs).202
194. See Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt, supra note 14, at 243–44 (set-
ting forth the “unusual, but not unheard of” cases in which the states of Alaska,
Massachusetts, Washington, California, Delaware, and Pennsylvania have em-
braced the possibility of three parents); see also Appleton, supra note 179, at
17–18 (discussing cases from Pennsylvania and Ontario that recognized more
than two legal parents for a child).
195. In 2011, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the Superior Court’s holding
enforcing a gestational agreement against the gestational carrier and declaring
the biological father and his same-sex partner as the intended, and, therefore,
legal parents of the child conceived by ART using the father’s sperm and eggs
donated by a third party (“true”) egg donor. See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783
(Conn. 2011).  Applying my parentage decision tree to these facts, the position of
Genetic Parent #1 would be unfilled, as the genetic mother was a “true” donor.
Genetic Parent #2 would be the biological father, who, though he used artificial
insemination, was a lender of genetic material.  The gestational carrier would be
the gestational mother; however, a properly executed surrogacy agreement would
be sufficient to exclude her as legal parent.  With only one of the three possible
claimants to biological parenthood being recognized as legal parent, the analysis
would shift to evaluating the nonbiological claimants to parentage by first apply-
ing legal presumptions.  Under Connecticut law, the marital presumption of par-
entage does not extend to unmarried partners.  The court, however, held that the
father’s same-sex partner did acquire the status of legal parent pursuant to the
enforceable gestation agreement.
196. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 22 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (noting that com-
mon law in the state of Washington recognizes the status of de facto parentage).
197. See Perri Koll, Note, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Rights of In-
tended Homosexual Male Parents in Surrogacy or Custody Disputes, 18 CARDOZO
J. L. & GENDER 199 (2011).
198. See Byrn and Ives, supra note 61, at 337 (critiquing the marital presumption of
paternity as not being in the best interest of the child).
199. See Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 1757–58 (coining the term “gestational father-
ing” and defining it as the parent who “supports and nurtures” the mother during
pregnancy).
200. See Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 672–73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (deny-
ing parentage by declaring a co-parenting agreement between lesbian partners
unenforceable and according no weight to the nonbiological partner’s status as de
facto parent for several years).
201. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising
from Same-Sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R.5TH 1 (2000).
202. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More
and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 72 (2010)
(nothing that some states, like Alaska and Nevada, do not address whether ge-
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States must also decide whether to restrict the status of parent to
maximum possible number of individuals for any given child.203
While an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to note that increasing the number of legal parents would
require corresponding modifications to the state’s custody laws, to
adoption laws, and to inheritance laws.204
Almost immediately, it is evident that this new view of parentage
does not resolve all issues that may arise.  For example, this paradigm
would allow two women to be termed the legal parents of a child, with-
out the utilization of adoption, but it would not permit the same for
two men.205  However, this is a limitation imposed by science, not by
the view of parentage proposed here.  If science ever advanced to the
point where two men could both have biological ties to the same
child,206 then the gender-neutral view of parentage proposed by this
Article would recognize the parent–child relationship between each
man and the child born out of their relationship.
A. A Gender-Neutral Parentage Decision Tree Does Not
Disrupt Other Concepts in the Parentage
Framework
It is important to note that the adoption of a gender-neutral defini-
tion of parentage does not disrupt other existing state policies con-
cerning parentage or marriage.  The presumption of paternity and
netic ties to the child are required for a VAP to be valid); See also Jeffrey Parness,
Federal Constitutional Childcare Interests and Superior Parental Rights in Illi-
nois, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 305, 337 (2013) (noting that VAPs are most often used
to acknowledge the believed biological parents of a child born out of wedlock).
203. See, e.g., In re M.C., 195 Cal. App. 4th 197 (Ct. App. 2011) (This case addresses
the parentage of a child conceived naturally through a sexual relationship be-
tween a man and a woman, the woman being married to another woman under
the laws of the state of California, giving rise to three claimants for parentage,
namely, the two biological parents and the “spouse” of the mother under an ex-
tension of the parentage presumption, which assigns parentage to a married wo-
man’s husband.  The appeals court determined that this child could not have
three legal parents.); See also Polikoff, supra note 61, at 2015 (using In re M.C. to
consider parentage of a child conceived through sexual intercourse and born to a
lesbian couple).
204. See generally Jacobs, More Parents, supra note 60.
205. See Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 849–54 (La. 1989) (acknowledging dual pater-
nity of a biological father and a legal father in Louisiana through statutory pre-
sumption and proven filiation); see also Slowinsky v. Sweeney, 117 So. 3d 73,
78–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that Florida does not recognize dual
fatherhood).  As these cases suggest, dual fathership would also be outside the
scope of the proposed parentage decision tree because it requires a nonbiological
based analysis of parentage.
206. It is already scientifically possible for female-to-male transgender people to bear
children because, although they identify as men, they may possess a functional
uterus. Male Pregnancy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/male_preg-
nancy (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
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state policies pertaining to intent-based parentage and de facto par-
entage remain unaffected by the removal of gender-based parentage
definitions.  Perhaps more importantly, the adoption of a gender-neu-
tral definition of parentage has no effect on a state’s policy regarding
same-sex marriage or second-parent adoption.  The biological parent-
age model is independent of evolving and conflicting state definitions
of marriage,207 as the model weighs neither marital status nor gender
as a disqualifying factor in determining parentage.  Because this pro-
posed view of parentage is centered on the relationship between the
adult and the child, not the relationship between the adults, states
can prohibit same-sex marriage and yet implement a statutory
scheme of gender-neutral parentage without compromising that social
policy.  Likewise, the proposed parentage decision tree would operate
within the confines of existing second-parent adoption statutes; it
would not force a state to recognize as a parent one who is barred from
such status and had no part in the biological creation of the child.
B. Gender-Neutral Parentage Is Consistent with Other
Advances in the Law
Modifications to the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) made in 2008
address the parentage of children of ART as it impacts the laws of
inheritance.208  The UPC could serve as a precedent for gender-neu-
tral changes to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).209  For example,
the UPC included in its 2008 revisions a more precise definition of
“donor,” referencing both a man who supplies sperm and a woman
who provides an egg for the purpose of assisted reproduction.210  The
UPA excludes from its definition of donor only sperm donors who “in-
tend to be the parent.”211  By contrast, in the vernacular proposed by
207. Same-sex marriage has caused states to define marriage differently. See gener-
ally Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/
same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last updated Oct. 16, 2013); see also Barbara
Cox, California Western School of Law, as a Discussant in the Discussion Group:
How the Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships is Transforming Family Law
Pedagogy and Scholarship at Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual
Conference (July 31, 2012) (referring to the mixed state of the law on same-sex
marriages as “a bizzare patchwork”).  As of October 2013, same-sex marriage is
available in fourteen states. Couples Wed, N.J. Becomes 14th State to OK Gay
Marriage, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2013, 12:25 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2013/10/21/gay-couples-wed-as-nj-recognizes-nuptials/3141655/.
208. See Knaplund, supra note 61, at 905–10 (supporting the call for legislative reform
and noting the superiority of the 2008 Uniform Probate Code (still largely
unadopted by states) over the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act in addressing legal
issues surrounding children of ART).
209. Id.
210. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-120(a)(3)(C) (amended 2010).
211. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702–03 (amended 2002).
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this Article, those so excluded from the term donor would include both
men and women, labeled as “lenders.”
Furthermore, the UPC provides that “[a] parent-child relationship
exists between a child of assisted reproduction and an individual other
than the birth mother who consented to assisted reproduction by the
birth mother with intent to be treated as the other parent of the
child.”212  The gender-neutrality of the word “individual” eradicates
the heterosexual bias found in other parentage statutes.  The move to
a gender-neutral definition of parentage is consistent with the trend
toward gender-neutral statutes in other areas of law, such as child
custody determinations.213  Additionally, many state penal codes have
substituted gender-neutral language in previously gendered crimes,
such as rape, and defenses, such as the heat-of-passion defense.214
C. Gender-Neutral Parentage Is Consistent with the Best-
Interest-of-the-Child Standard Used in Family Law
In child custody determinations, gender-specific doctrines, such as
the tender-years doctrine,215 have been replaced with multifactor
tests that are gender-neutral in form, if not always in application.216
The issue of parentage is the conceptual predecessor to the issue of
custody.  The gender neutrality that pervades the statutory grounds
for a judicial determination of custody must now infuse our thinking
on parentage.217
Parentage is solely about the relationship between adult and child,
and genetics and intent to parent have traditionally been at the heart
of that relationship.  This Article contends that they should remain
central in determining that relationship, even if the composition of the
family unit is not as predictable as it once was.  The standard for
resolving issues that pertain to children is most often the best-inter-
est-of-the-child standard, and such standard should be applied in the
212. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f).
213. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (West 2010).
214. See Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, Treat Your Women Well: Comparisons and Lessons
from an Imperfect Example Across the Waters, 26 SO. ILL. U. L. J. 403 (2002).
215. The tender-years doctrine is a common law preference for awarding disputed cus-
tody of very young children to the mother. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, tender-
years doctrine (9th ed. 2009).
216. A mother may still be favored in a custody determination if she is the primary
caregiver, but the preference is based upon each parent’s actions, not upon the
parent’s gender. Id.
217. See Knaplund, supra note 61, at 928 (noting the policy incongruence in states
which, on the one hand, permit gay and lesbian couples to adopt or foster parent
children but, on the other, limit parentage in the ART context to heterosexual
couples).
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determination of parentage.218  While it may violate some states’ pub-
lic policy to acknowledge that a child can have two parents of the same
sex,219 to deny this is to improperly shift the focus of parentage deter-
minations to the relationship between the parents.  Such a shift in
focus violates a proper conceptual understanding of parentage.  Par-
entage is separate from and not dependent upon a state’s view of
same-sex relationships or its laws defining the legal status of such
relationships.
The best interest of the child requires that courts prioritize the ver-
tical relationship between parent and child, rather than the horizontal
relationship with the other parent.220  When courts narrow their focus
to the proper vertical relationship, it should become clear that parent-
age can no longer be cloaked in gender-specific language that may not
serve the best interests of the child.  Just as the courts of most states
recognize that the involvement of one parent in a same-sex relation-
ship following a divorce is not a sufficient basis to alter that parent’s
legal status as a parent,221 courts must likewise conclude that it is not
a sufficient basis to deny parentage at the time the child is born.222
The proposed biological parentage decision tree is child-centric and
consistent with the best interest of the child legal standard.  It sup-
plies the correct starting point for parentage, guaranteeing what some
218. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 12 A.3d 768, 774 (Vt. 2010) (using the
best-interests-of-the-child standard to transfer custody of a minor child from the
biological mother to the former civil-union partner of the biological mother).
219. For purposes of this application, the verb “can” is used in its traditional sense,
meaning “to be able” instead of “may,” meaning “to be permitted.”
220. Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has written prolifically on protecting the
interest of the child and preserving the child’s perspective in law and policy deci-
sions. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Foreward, Defending Childhood:
Developing a Child-Centered Law and Policy Agenda, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y vii (2003); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Enhancing Children’s Par-
ticipation in Policy Formation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 751 (2003) (noting that “[i]n order
to build a system that will be responsive to children’s needs, we must learn to
listen to children’s voices.  We must do this in the academy, in the courts and in
political life.”)
Recently, there has been a movement towards a more “child-centered”
approach to defining laws and policies.  A child-centered approach has a
number of key components: (1) it approaches problems from the child’s
perspective, focusing on the child’s own lived experience; (2) it incorpo-
rates children’s voices and children’s leadership; (3) it treats children as
presumptively capable of participation rather than presumptively lack-
ing in capacity; (4) it is inclusive, embracing all children and their fami-
lies as our own; (5) it is developmentally sound, taking into account
children’s unique needs, and respecting their cognitive and physical de-
velopment; (6) it is interdisciplinary, bringing all relevant expertise to
bear on problems of children and youth.
Id.
221. See generally P.W. v. D.W., No.CK10-01535, 2010 WL 7884673 (Del. Fam. Ct.
Oct. 5, 2010).
222. Parentage is chronologically earlier and the conceptual precursor to custody.
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have called “a child’s fundamental right to legal parents at birth.”223
Hard cases, nevertheless, remain.  Where both biological parents and
a functional parent all have claims to parentage, the law should ac-
knowledge all three parents.224  The determination of parentage be-
gins with one individual, the child.  It is relational only with respect to
the child.  Conceptual parallels in the law are abundant.225  Consider,
for example, the laws of descent and distribution in which the default
rules of inheritance measure heirs in relation to the decedent, not in
relation to each other.226  Likewise, under the default rules of parent-
age, the parents should be determined in relation to the child.227
V. THE TEMPORARY FIX: WHAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
STATE AGENCIES, AND THE COURTS CAN DO
The disjunction between current statutory language delineating
parentage228 and the previously unimaginable procreative fact pat-
terns to which these statutes are being applied has prompted several
courts to implore their state legislatures to act.229  Until state legisla-
223. Byrn & Ives, supra note 61, at 308.
224. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Tie Binds? Redefining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011,
1044–47 (2003) (discussing the hard case presented by the facts of Michael H.
from a child-centric perspective).
225. For an interesting discussion of the history of the nuances of early adoption laws
and practices, including the paradigm shift from the best interest of the mother
to the best interest of the child, see Cahn, supra note 33, at 173.
226. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (amended 2010).
227. Although outside the scope of this Article—which is limited to advocating the
parentage of those biologically connected to the child—there is an emerging body
of case law and scholarship evaluating the propriety of awarding custodial or visi-
tation rights to a former same-sex partner of the biological parent where such
partner has no biological connection to the child. See generally Black v. Simms,
12 So. 3d 1140 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (evaluating whether the same-sex partner of
the biological mother of the child has custodial or visitation rights and holding
that, under these specific facts, she does not); Miller, supra note 201; Polikoff,
supra note 61.
228. Parentage is not a single definition under most state statutory schemes.  Rather,
parentage is addressed under the custody statutes, under the adoption statutes,
and under the inheritance statutes. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 102
(amended 2002); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2–2 (West 2006).
229. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Drowota of the Tennessee Supreme Court
stated “In our view, given the far-reaching, profoundly complex, and competing
public policy considerations necessarily implicated by the present controversy,
crafting a broadly applicable rule for the establishment of maternity where tech-
niques for assisted human reproduction are involved is more appropriately ad-
dressed by the Tennessee General Assembly.” In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 733
(Tenn. 2005). See also Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 801 (Conn. 2011) (noting
that existing statutes do not adequately address modern concerns involving re-
productive technology and that the legislature, “with the ability to hold public
hearings and seek out expert assistance, is the appropriate one to make such
public policy determinations”); see also Parness, Federal Constitution of Child-
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tures take the steps to adopt gender-neutral definitions of parentage,
which unambiguously award parental status to all three claim-holders
to biological parentage, progress can be made toward gender-neutral-
ity through other avenues, including the private sector, state agencies,
and the courts.230
Reproductive clinics should re-evaluate their preprinted forms to
determine if they are specifically tailored to effectuate the proper con-
sent.  Often such forms are over-inclusive, containing boilerplate lan-
guage that far exceeds the medical consent to have eggs removed from
one’s ovaries for the purpose of ART.231  Such forms are intended for
true donation of genetic material and, as a result, are intended to pro-
tect both the fertility clinic and the intended parents by serving as a
waiver of parental rights that under state law might otherwise belong
to a biological parent.  The inapplicability of such a standard form to
an intended parent is obvious.  Reproductive clinics should offer two
versions of informed consent forms, the first being a “True Donor
Form” with a waiver of parental rights and the second being an “In-
formed Consent of Genetic Lender Form” allowing the removal and
use of genetic material for the procreation of a child with no waiver of
parental rights or responsibilities by the genetic lender.
Until such dual forms are widely available, courts should follow
the lead of the California Supreme Court232 and the New York Surro-
gate’s Court233 in denying determinative value to such forms.  Medical
clinics can revise informed consent forms to better recognize and en-
force the distinction between donors and lenders when it comes to the
use of one’s genetic material.  This rather simple reformation would
clearly define the role of the owner of the genetic material and would
not unilaterally compel an individual into the role of a donor when the
intent to parent is also present.  However, providing the supplier of
care Interests and Superior Parental Rights in Illinois, supra note 202, at 323
(noting the need in Illinois for a comprehensive legislative solution to parental
rights).
230. Justice Scalia has already called for “a judicially crafted definition of parents” to
vindicate parental rights.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92–91 (2000) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
231. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 676 (Cal. 2005) (highlighting the language in
the consent form, which read: “It is understood that I waive any right and relin-
quish any claim to the donated eggs or any pregnancy or offspring that might
result from them . . . [and] I agree that the recipient may regard the donated eggs
and any offspring resulting therefrom as her own children.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla.
2013) (describing the strict language of the preprinted form signed by T.M.H. at
the reproductive doctor’s office).
232. K.M., 117 P.3d at 679 (using an “intent test” to determine parentage and override
the language of the consent form).
233. In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S. 2d 677 (Surr. Ct. 2009).
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procreative material the option of defining herself as either a genetic
lender with a continuing parental role or as a genetic donor retaining
no such rights falls short of establishing a legal basis for
parenthood.234  Nevertheless, such forms would greatly inform the
medical clinic, the recipient of procreative material, and a court
charged with allocating parental rights.
Additionally, courts could engage in “dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion.”235  If, current parentage statutes are interpreted “in light of
their present societal, political, and legal context” rather than purely
through the backward focused lens of legislative intent,236 then courts
could presently justify a gender-neutral approach to parentage in the
absence of specific statutory language to that effect.237  A word, like
parent, may evolve over time to encompass more than the word origi-
nally meant.  Most parentage statutes are historically limited.238  As
science has changed the possible routes to parentage, the law must
correspondingly acknowledge all such routes.239  Some courts, such as
those in California, are leading the way.240
234. The value of differentiating between true donor forms and genetic lender forms is
diminished by the possibility of extending parental rights and obligations to true
donors.  For example, California legislation SB 115, approved by the California
Senate in April 2013, would expand the parental rights of sperm donors in lim-
ited cases by allowing them to seek paternal rights upon a showing of a relation-
ship with the child.  S.B. 115, 2013–2013 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).  The “godfather”
of the bill, so to speak, is actor Jason Patric, whose child custody battle has re-
ceived national attention. See Sydney Lupkin, Jason Patric Bill May Boost
Sperm Donor Rights, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2013, 1:21 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/health/2013/07/09/jason-patric-bill-boosts-sperm-donor-rights/.
235. See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
236. Id. at 1479.
237. Many courts are imploring the legislation to modify the state statutory definition
of parentage. See, e.g., T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. SC12–261, 2013 WL 5942278 (Fla.
2013); see also In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 396 n.12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(noting “need for [statutory] revision in light of technological advances”); In re
Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 136–37 (Md. 2007) (Cathell, J., dissenting) (noting
that, “the resolution of this issue does not lie within the Judicial Branch of gov-
ernment but with the Legislative Branch”).  Additionally, in the absence of legis-
lative action, some courts are filling the definitional void on their own. See, e.g.,
Nolan v. La Bree, 52 A.3d 923, 924–26 (Me. 2012).
238. Sheldon, supra note 12, at 144 (commending the Nolan court for being an “ac-
tivist on family law issues” and for “social change when there’s no reason not to”).
239. Noting the tension between applying the current state statute and arriving at the
correct result, the trial judge in T.M.H. v. D.M.T. stated, “I do not agree with the
current state of the law, but I must uphold it.  I believe the law is not caught up
with science nor the state of same-sex marriages.  I do think that is on the hori-
zon.” T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 789.
240. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993) (stating “courts must construe
statutes in factual settings not contemplated by the enacting legislature”).
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Finally, birth certificates must be modified.  This will require the
cooperation of the Division of Vital Records.  Statutes regulating birth
certificates are properly understood as administratively and ministe-
rially enacted to provide a framework for properly reflecting the in-
tended parent–child relationship.241  There are ample precedents for
modifying administrative forms that have become outdated.242
VI. CONCLUSION
What once was attributable to exactly two individuals, scientifi-
cally required to be one male and one female, parentage has evolved
both scientifically and legally to encompass a possible plethora of indi-
viduals claiming the title of parent. Are You My Mother? has become
more than a clever story.243
The distinction between lender and donor for providers of genetic
material in ART would clarify both the sword of seeking parental
rights and the shield of avoiding parental support obligations.  Once
the distinction becomes clear, parental rights and obligations can be
recognized as two sides of the same coin.  A lender would both main-
tain parental rights and be responsible for providing child support,
while a donor would neither have parental rights nor be obligated for
support.
The modern definition of parentage has arisen within a legal
framework that embraces distinct tests of maternity and paternity,
attributes parentage through presumptions limited by a state’s defini-
tion of marriage, and resorts to intent-based constructive tests of par-
entage that can trump a biological parent’s role.  While historically
valuable, these gender-specific and relationship-based tracks to
parenthood are no longer necessary and, in fact, may deprive an indi-
vidual of the legal status of parent solely because of her gender.  In-
tent remains an important litmus test for the hard cases, but
biological ties are the appropriate starting point.244
241. L.F.v. Breit, 736 S.E. 2d 711, 724 (Va. 2013).
242. See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 117 (holding that, with developments in
ART, it is no longer necessary to list the name of a gestational mother on a child’s
birth certificate).  The Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), used by
colleges to assess financial need, will be modified in April 2014 to provide for the
disclosure of the income of both parents in a same-sex marriage by removing gen-
der-specific references to mother and father; however, there are already instruc-
tions asking students to provide information for both parents, regardless of
gender. See FED. STUDENT AID, DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORTING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
ON THE FAFSA (2013), http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/reporting-same-
sex-marriage-on-fafsa.pdf.
243. For a delightful analysis of parental rights drawn from yet another clever chil-
dren’s story, see Woodhouse, supra note 11.
244. Hard cases will remain, but the facts of K.M v. E.G. and T.M.H. v. D.M.T. are not
hard cases.  K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675–77 (Cal. 2005); T.M.H., 79 So.3d at
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Parents are born with the birth of a child. Notwithstanding the
scientific breakthroughs in reproductive technology and the more in-
clusive modern understanding of the family unit, every child begins
with two—and only two—suppliers of genetic material and one—and
only one—gestational carrier.  Thus, the only logically clear starting
point for a legal definition of parentage begins with these three claim-
holders to parentage.  Once the concept of parentage is disentangled
from the complications of related, but logically independent, legal
questions, it becomes clear that unless and until the rights and obliga-
tions of parentage are either (voluntarily) contractually waived or (in-
voluntarily) judicially or statutorily terminated, the law must
recognize as parent any individual who is biologically related to a
child, regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or marital status.
788–90.  A child can have two biological mothers, and our understanding of par-
entage must acknowledge all biological parents.
